UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones

8-1-2011

Development of a Sustainable Water Resource
Financing Mathematical Model for Donors and
End-Users
Sahar Zavareh
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, sahar.zavareh@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons, Natural Resource Economics
Commons, Sustainability Commons, and the Water Resource Management Commons
Repository Citation
Zavareh, Sahar, "Development of a Sustainable Water Resource Financing Mathematical Model for Donors and End-Users" (2011).
UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones. 1964.
https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations/1964

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Scholarship@UNLV. It has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses, Dissertations,
Professional Papers, and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

DEVELOPMENT OF A SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCE FINANCING
MATHEMATICAL MODEL FOR DONORS AND END-USERS

by

Sahar B. Zavareh

Bachelor of Business Administration
University of Houston – Downtown
2001

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Masters of Science in Water Resource Management
Department of Water Resource Management
College of Sciences
Graduate College

University of Nevada, Las Vegas
December 2011

Copyright by Sahar B. Zavareh 2011
All Rights Reserved

THE GRADUATE COLLEGE

We recommend the thesis prepared under our supervision by

Sahar B. Zavareh
entitled

Development of a Sustainable Water Resource Financing Mathematical
Model for Donors and End-Users
is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science - Water Resource Management
Department of Water Resource Management

Pushkin Kachroo, Ph.D., Committee Chair
Scott Nowicki, Ph.D., Committee Member
Sajjad Ahmad, Ph.D., Committee Member
Robert Futrell, Ph.D., Graduate College Representative
Kathryn Hausbeck Korgan, Ph.D., Interim Dean of the Graduate College

December 2011

ii

ABSTRACT
Development of a Sustainable Water Resource Financing Mathematical Model for
Donors and End-Users
by
Sahar B. Zavareh
Dr. Pushkin Kachroo, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Rural villages and underdeveloped communities represent the largest group
challenged by poor water supply and sanitation with inequalities in resources to
adequately implement potential solutions and even more with their high risk level
of financing, funding is particularly challenging for water projects. Innovative
financing alone will not eliminate the burdens of rural villages and underdeveloped
communities. The purpose of this thesis is to address the lack of sustainable water
financing of water projects in rural areas using a novel framework of a
mathematical model based on “system dynamics” using optimal feedback control
theory to maximize the performance of a water project. This is achieved by using
feedback loops that allow for a real-time adjustment of the input parameters. The
case model presented considers a renewable water supply system for a rural village
where the user’s willingness to pay along with demand drive the performance
indicators to simulate how decision makers can make real-time decisions on how to
manage financing instruments and long-term debt. The results of the study are the
first step to the mathematical framework of optimal control of cash flows. Future
research is aimed at applying optimal control using ordinary differential equations
and stochastic differential equations which is presented in theoretical form.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Water is the basis of life; central to the material and cultural well-being of
societies worldwide (Shiva, 2002). Civilizations have risen and fallen with the
changing water (Roy, 2011). Given that water is such a precious commodity to
society, where less than two-thirds of the Earth’s surface covered by water,
managing this finite resource is essential to our future well-being. Our water
challenges lie within the lack of development in poor countries, rather than the
absence of available water (Segerfeldt, 2005). These challenges arise with the
inability to produce and distribute safe water in countries that lack sufficient
infrastructure development (Segerfeldt, 2005).

The most common water-uses consist of drinking, cooking, bathing,
cleaning, and agricultural usage. The most crucial is domestic water use but
industry consumes twice the amount than households (Cosgrove & Rijsberman,
2000). There are one billion people without access to water within a 15-minute
walk of their homes and 25 million people that die each year from contaminated
water (Roddick, 2004). Currently there are more than 2 billion people that have no
sanitation system (Frerot, 2011). Furthermore, the UN estimates that in less than
20 years, 5 billion people will live in areas where it will be impossible or nearly
impossible to collect water for basic sanitation, cooking, and drinking needs, if we
continue with current water consumption trends (Roddick, 2004).

In 2000 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which specified targets for sustainable
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation provisions for 2015 (UNDP,
1

2011). Much progress has been made but many countries still fall short of these
goals. As we approach 2015, 235 million people will not meet the drinking water
provisions and 700 million people from 74 countries will not achieve basic water
sanitation (Frerot, 2011).

1.1 Water Financing

Water serves as a resource and a service which must be developed,
managed, and distributed. Both the resource and service aspects require financing
which is currently found to be deficient due to its lack of sustainability (Winpenny,
2003). Water infrastructure is financed by three different sources: water users
usually through some form of water billing arrangement, taxpayers, and aid donors.
Financing water infrastructure requires monies to be spent on financing long-term
physical assets. These include but are not limited to present cash flows or reserves
on water projects or by loans or equity, which must be repaid by sources from
users, taxpayers or donors (Winpenny, 2003). Sources of water funds (Winpenny,
2003):

-

Water users

-

Informal suppliers

-

Public water authorities and utilities

-

Private companies

-

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local communities

-

Local banks and other financial institutions

-

International banks and export credit agencies
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-

International aid from multilateral and bilateral sources

-

Environmental and water funds

-

National central and local governments

The discussions of financing water policies and water regimes have steadily
been at the forefront of global environmental politics (Porter & Brown, 2006). A
central concern to comply with obligations stipulated under environmental treaties
or environmental projects, such as the MDGs, set to improve social and economic
conditions in the world’s poorest countries, are the need for financial and technical
assistance of water projects in developing countries. These challenges will be
continually encountered throughout the debate of global environmental policy.
Improving financial resources for advancing water infrastructures is a major
obstacle of compliance for implementing water projects, as well as addressing the
lack of financial and technical resources to fulfill project obligations, which are the
key to project effectiveness (Porter & Brown, 2006). Ultimately, the success of
water programs lies within innovative approaches to financing.

Much debate has recently occurred over the role of donors in the water market,
especially concerning the private sector which is presently involved in less than
10% of the MDGs drinking water provisions (Frerot, 2011). Official development
assistance (ODA) has been the principal source of funding for developing countries
since World War II, especially in leveraging other financial flows such as bank
loans or bond financing (Ketkar and Ratha, 2006). ODA has primarily been
allocated in projects for water supply and sanitation projects of large systems and
policies as shown in Figure 1 (Ketkar and Ratha, 2006). Examining how water
projects are segmented based on credit risk potential exposes the limitations of
available financing in the sector. Figure 2 points out the exposed areas of financing
3

not covered by the private sector of larger scale projects, where the risk associated
is considered to be too high for investments and generally does not meet the
guidelines of ODA investments. For smaller scale projects with high risks,
microloans are the financing instrument utilized and are not considered for any
other type of funding structure. The main objective of microfinance has been to
improve and increase the flow of funds to high risk and low income clients in
developing countries (Schicks and Rosenberg, 2011).

0%
7%

Water Resource
Policy/Admininstrative Management

3%
19%

Water Resources Protection

18%

3%

Water Supply & Sanitation (Large
Systems)
Basic Drinking Water Supply and
Sanitation
River Development

Waste Management Disposal
50%
Education/Training : Water Supply &
Sanitation

Figure 1.1. Breakdown of ODAs for Water by Project Type (Ketkar and Ratha,
2006)
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Figure 1.2. Water Projects Segmentation, Financing Options (Winpenny, 2003)

“Developing countries have always looked for new and innovative ways of
raising finance” (Ketkar & Ratha, 2009, p.2). When trying to understand the
meaning of innovative financing there is no universal definition available. For this
thesis the definition provided by the World Bank will be used (Sandor, Scott &
Benn, 2009):

“Innovative financing involves non-traditional applications of solidarity,
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), and catalytic mechanisms that (i)
support fundraising by tapping new sources and engaging investors beyond
the financial dimension of transactions, as partners and stakeholders in
development; or (ii) deliver financial solutions to development problems on
the ground” (p.3).
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The definition points out that the way we manage our water resources must
include all the stakeholders, so that they, the investors and end-users, have the
power to manage their own resources, respectively. Water financing should focus on
being more responsive to all the stakeholders and not biased to just the investor or
only the end-users, so that the projects can be more effective in distribution,
management, and maintenance of the water resources. If there is a monetary stake,
the water usage, service needs, and expectations of users will influence the financial
instruments implemented in the project model. Empowering the communities to be
a stakeholder can lead the way to improving designs and operations of local water
resources, making them more sustainable. Because stakeholders have different
stances on which they base terms set forth for financing, it is necessary to evaluate
these conditions by each stakeholder in an effective model that can measure both
the risk and financing terms.

1.2 Problem Statement
Rural villages and underdeveloped communities represent a large portion of
the population faced by the challenges of poor water supply and sanitation but
vary widely amid economic resources and water resource models (Cardone and
Fonseca, 2006). However, due to the high risk level of financing water projects in
these communities, funding is particularly challenging. Additionally, many water
projects have been found to lack sustainability. Water For People (WFP), an NGO
aiming to address sustainable coverage of water and sanitation, found that as many
as 50% of the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) projects completed by all
service and faith-based organizations have not demonstrated sustainability within
five years of their completion, indicating that many WASH projects are not
designed or implemented to be sustainable (WASRAG, 2008). Further research of
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WFP in 2010 observed that “successful water and sanitation interventions actually
get into the financial details that will influence supplies over time. Unfortunately
most organizations shy away from this challenge because it is hard and time
consuming. This is short sighted of course, and projects fail because NGOs dodge
this hard work by making the case that communities suffer not just from water
poverty but also from cashlessness in this particular paradigm” (Breslin, 2010 p.
67).

1.2 Purpose/Research Question
The purpose of this thesis is to address the lack of sustainable water
financing of water projects in rural areas by a novel framework. The proposed
mathematical model is based on “system dynamics” and uses optimal feedback
control theory to maximize the performance of a water project. This is achieved by
using feedback loops that allow for a real-time adjustment of the input parameters.

1.3 Scope
The scope of this thesis is to:

1. Assess all of the stakeholder’s willingness and ability to pay rather than
idealistic projections and expectations to identify parameters to measure
objectives of an ideal water project

2. Target rural and underdeveloped communities

7

3. Focuses on borrower-lender financing strategies to optimize usage of
funds to facilitate the definition of appropriate terms for water financed
projects for an ideal return and success of the project for all stakeholders

4. Demonstrate the need to integrate system dynamics with optimal control
theory with feedback loops using ordinary differential equations or
stochastic differential equations

1.4 Objectives
The objectives of this thesis are to:

1. Propose a mathematical model as a basis of a theoretical framework for
sustainable financing mechanisms of water projects funded by groups
like NGOs, philanthropic donors, and investors
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis is organized into seven chapters; examining the infrastructure of
water financing for the development of the framework for the mathematic model in
a system dynamics approach.

1. Chapter 1 introduced the challenges of water financing in general and in
particular pertaining to rural communities. It further discusses the objective
of this thesis and current financing mechanisms of water projects to
demonstrate the need for creating a sustainable and practical mathematical
model for water financing.
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2. Chapter 2 presents the examination of the stakeholders involved in the cash
flow of monies distributed and financed for water projects. What are their
objectives and interests in funding water projects? Evaluation of how to
manage donor expectations without sacrificing the needs of the benefactors
of these projects.

3. Chapter 3 discusses and evaluates current financing structures of water
projects. The applied financial instruments are examined in terms of their
applicability, potential, and limitations for water financing.

4. Chapter 4 assesses the benefactors of water projects financed by the donors
discussed in Chapter 2. The benefactors are investigated with respect to
weighing impact with long-term benefits and losses for stakeholders.

5. Chapter 5 presents the framework of optimal water financing. Current water
financing frameworks are reviewed and details of the proposed model are
discussed.

6. Chapter 6 demonstrates the functionality of the framework through analysis
of a model case for which flexible financing terms that are measurable,
clearly defined, and manage stakeholder expectations with appropriate time
scales that are adjustable as needed to achieve objectives set forth by the
project, are created. The results of the model results are discussed in detail.

7. Chapter 7 summarizes the results of the research presented in this thesis.

9

CHAPTER 2
DONORS

2.1 Background
When examining the donor profiles of the water sector, there are two
categories of financial support: Internal Financing Agencies (IFAs) and External
Financing Agencies (EFAs). IFAs generally constitute of national governments
whereas EFAs comprise of NGOs, charitable organizations, philanthropic donors,
and investors (Hamdy, 2002). Donors aim to benefit rural and underdeveloped
communities that focus on borrower-lender financing strategies to optimize the
usage of funds. Donor investments in the water sector are provided in the following
Figure 2.1. The figures represent financial contributions from major bilateral and
multilateral donors of water supply, sanitation, irrigation and water resources
(Hamdy, 2002).
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OECD bilateral (1996)

World Bank (1998)

ADB (1997)

EU (1995)

IADB (1998)

UNDP (1998)

UNICEF (1996)
1%
3%
4%

11%

13%

51%

17%

Figure 2.1. Donor Investments in the Water Sector in bn US$ (Source: Hamdy,
2002)

A closer examination of where the funds derive in the water sector was
conducted in the “Financing Water For All Report” chaired by Michel Camdessus.
By assessing the source of funds the data and figures can be incorporated into an
appropriate platform for the demand and supply side. The following is a
breakdown of the water funds source analysis from the report (Winpenny, 2003):

-

Water users
o Include households, farmers, and industry. Householder consumers in
rural areas and especially in poorer urban districts invest available
cash, labor, and materials in wells, pipes, essential sanitation, and
other basic necessities. Farmers tend to invest largely in tubewells,
pumps, and surface irrigation systems facilitated by member
11

associations and user groups. In some cases farmers can sell surpluses
of water in the open market. Industry and business will commonly
develop their own water supplies and treatment facilities, which in
some cases support the local communities. Tariffs are also a form of
water subsidy for water infrastructure to support the general
population demands and supply.

-

Informal suppliers
o Where there is a lack of infrastructure from the public services or
investors, there are those that will provide water in bulk from
tankers, containers and bottles.

-

Public water authorities and utilities
o Consist of funds from regular spending and investments from
revenues generated by user charges, loans or public subsidies.

-

Private companies
o Include local or foreign funds from resources such as public utilities
and equity investments.

-

Non-governmental organizations and local communities
o These groups raise funds from private contributions, donations or
grants.

-

Local banks and other financial institutions
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o These institutions offer short-term (up to three years) to mediumterm (three to ten years) loans at market rates.

-

International banks and export credit agencies
o Provide

larger

capacities

of

finance

than

traditional

local

establishments that entail corporate guarantees or projected cash
flow analysis.

-

International aid from multilateral and bilateral sources
o Consist of loans based on concessional terms or grants.

-

Multilateral Financial Institutions
o Consist of loans with near-market terms.

-

Environmental and water funds
o Contain a variety of expenditures such as earmarked tax funds,
directed credit funds, and green funds.

-

National central and local governments
o Provide subsidies, guarantees of loans, and proceeds of bond issues.

The water sector tends to generally obtain funds through government
budgets which are the largest contributors, development agencies which consist of
bilateral, multilateral and NGOs along with domestic based private operators and
a limited amount from the international private sector (Cardone and Fonseca,
2006). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
13

created the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to measure international
aid flow. The official DAC for Official Development Assistance (ODA) specifies
“money flows to countries on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing
countries) and to multilateral institutions for flows to Part I aid recipients”
(Clermont, 2006). The ODA is provided by agencies, state, and local governments
or by third parties involved in distribution of funds. Each transaction must meet
two conditions:

a. The transaction is administered with the promotion of the economic
development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective;
and

b. Is given special consideration and contains a grant element higher than
25% (calculated at a discount rate of 10 per cent). The definition of a
grant element is calculated as “the difference between the face value of
the loan and the discounted present value of the service payments the
borrower will make over the lifetime of the loan, expressed as a
percentage of the face value” (Clermont, 2006).

2.2 ODA Source of Funds
ODA is made up of grants and concessional loans to support socio-economic
development from a government of a donor country directly to a developing
country or a multilateral agency. A significant issue in the development of
cooperation of this aid is the allocation of ODA and the classification by region,
country, sector or focus area. Donors’ allocations largely are directed by their
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governing policy resulting in conservative allocations, where established obligations
tend to stay at same levels with limited changes through small adjustments
(OECD, 2009).

ODA can be in the form of a bilateral or multilateral transaction. For a
transaction to be considered bilateral it must remain under control of two parties:
the donor country and the recipient country. An exception is made when the aid is
passed through NGOs or international aid organizations but is under the control of
the donor country. Unlike a bilateral contribution of two parties, a multilateral
ODA consists of donations from OEDC member countries to international
organizations working with the recipient country for aid, where they may provide
all or part of the activities involved with the aid (Clermont, 2006).

ODA multilateral sources relatively stayed at 600 million dollars through
the late 1990s which began to rise and accounted for 85% of commitments until the
mid-1990s. An increase of multilateral grants is the most recent trend in
multilateral grants. ODA for water funded by multilateral aid commitments was
25% at the beginning of the 1990s but has gradually risen to 30% of late, which
indicates a change in policy of donors moving from bilateral policies and supporting
more efforts of international institutions in the water sector (Clermont, 2006).

There have also been bilateral aid increases in commitments from 1.9 billion
dollars in 1990 to 2.4 billion dollars in 2002 (Clermont, 2006). Many bilateral
grants are outpacing the issuance of bilateral loans, which indicates that grant
terms are more favorable for lender-borrowers than loans. These trends can be
observed of bilateral and multilateral commitments in the following figure:

15

Figure 2.2. Bilateral and Multilateral Annual ODA Commitments for Water as
Loans and Grants (5-year moving average in 2003 constant dollars) (Source:
Clermont, 2006
When reviewing the donor countries of ODA in Figure 2.3, seventy percent
of the water aid comes from only 5 donors: Japan, IDA, Germany, United States,
and France (OECD, 2009).
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Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United
Kingdom
United States

Total DAC
Countries
AfDF
AsDF
EU
Institutions
IDA
IDB Sp.Fund
IFAD
GEF
UNDP
UNICEF
UNECE

Total
Multilateral
Total

Commitments,
USD million
03-04
05-06
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122
35.9
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53.5
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224.1
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1.8
1
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1800.1
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15.2
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2.1
4.7
31.8
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1.9
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62.9
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42
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% All Donors

07-08
17.4
31.3
99.5
35.8
26.8
42.3
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1.9
23.3
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383.4
1.6
48.3
1
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% of Donor
Total
05-06 07-08
1
1
7
8
8
8
2
1
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3
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8
4
6
9
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1
1
5
4
9
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9
9
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2
1
2
2
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0
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0
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0
1
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5
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0
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2
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0
5
0
1
0
5
1
1
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1
1.9
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23.3
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16.7
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2.9
46.9
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1.9
1
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41.5
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209.6
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3
5

3
3

2
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3
9
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7
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..
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0.7
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10
8

8
7

31
100

27
100

1170.9
4458.2
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4841.7

Figure 2.3. ODA Commitments by Countries and Amounts (Source: OECD, 2010)

The amount of ODA allocated for the water sector per capita appears to be
determined by three principal factors (Clermont, 2006):

• The demographic weight of the country: ODA is representative of a
relationship between the borrower and lender, where the number of projects
is not proportional to the population of the country. The data reflects that
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for a heavily populated country, there is less ODA for water per capita
distribution.

• The economic and political stability of the country: There is a minimum
level of political and economic stability required for the country to receive
funding because of the long-term commitment and scope of the project.

• Geopolitical objectives: The concerns of the donor countries are founded
on the geostrategies of the recipient country as well as the prior and
geographical relations between donors and recipients.

2.3 What is the private sector?
The private sector contains a wide range of individuals and groups, even
though they do not provide official development assistance, they act as service and
funding providers that include for-profit private sectors, foundations, NGOs,
voluntary aid, and support, as well as private academia groups (OECD, 2011).
With the development of private foundations playing an increasing role in the
financing arena, it is necessary to bring the public and private sectors together
through mechanisms such as public-private partnerships. There is an emerging
recognition of the private sectors role in creating income growth and poverty
reduction within partner countries to improve frameworks for financing (OECD,
2011).

There are currently no exact figures of the private flows in the marketplace.
The OECD DAC collects data on grants by private voluntary agencies, private
flows at market terms, and bilateral ODA through NGOs. According to 2007 data,
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the scale of development operations of the world’s foundation is roughly USD 5
billion annually, with US-based foundations playing the major role, EuropeanAsian foundations contributing as well with an estimation of international grants
by the European foundation of 600 million USD annually and 400 million USD
annually for Asian foundations (OECD, 2011). The following Table 2.2 is the latest
tracking of private flows published by the OECD in June 2011.

Grants by Private Voluntary Agencies (Total 2005

2006

DAC countries)

14,648 17,866 23,655

14,712

2007

2008

Private Flows at Market Terms (long-term)

2005

2006

2007

2008

(1 to 4) (Total DAC countries)

179,559

194,761

312,475

121,224

1. Direct investment

100,622

127,925

180,293

178,140

2. Private export credits

5,563

3,137

13,161

6,572

3. Securities of multilateral agencies

40

2,789

-9,737

-9,983

4. Bilateral portfolio investment

73,335

60,910

128,759

-53,504

Bilateral

ODA:

Grants

and

grant-like 2005

2006

2007

2008

contributions of which are contributions to 1,017

1,779

2,037

2,516

NGOs (Total DAC countries)
Figure 2.4. Data on Private Flows in USD Millions (Source: OECD, 2011)
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2.4 Other Funding Sources
Other sources of funding considered by the water sector include: (OECD, 2009)



Global taxes on currency transactions and energy use.



Voluntary private sector contributions through donations, global
lotteries, premium bonds or global funds.



The International Finance Facility, which set up a pilot program
on immunization in January 2006 with the support of France, Italy,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Solidarity taxes
on air tickets. Currently nine countries have adopted this tax, and
the proceeds are mainly used to fund accelerated access to
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria drugs through other aid
organizations.



Advanced Market Commitments to provide incentives for the
development of vaccines important to developing countries.



Sovereign wealth funds, established either from export receipts
earned from a nonrenewable resource or from very high corporate
or household saving rates and surpluses. These funds could become
major sources of development finance.
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2.5 Donor Objectives and Interest in Funding Water Projects
Much of the donor base for OAD is rooted in the foundation of improving
water supply and sanitation in line with the MDGs, targeting countries most in
need (OECD and WWC, 2008). However, donors choose different reasons for such
aid that can be as simple as wanting to improve the borrower’s economic
development whether it is to further their own political, strategic or commercial
interests, maintaining historical and cultural ties, or to demonstrate their
humanitarian aid (World Bank, 1985). Humanitarian aid can be in the form of
interventions to save lives in an emergency context that can pertain to water,
health and education that is not factored as OAD contributions (OECD and
WWC, 2008). These objectives can affect how aid is given as well as reduce the
effectiveness of financial flows promoting development (World Bank, 1985).

A study published by the World Bank in the 1980s observed the role of nondevelopment considerations in determining ODA distributions. These results
showed that DAC donors generally required the recipient or borrower to purchase
goods and services from the donor country, whereby 43 percent of aid given in the
form of “tying” was bilateral ODA and another 11 percent was partially tied
(World Bank, 1985). The World Bank acknowledged in their findings that the
percentages reported were most likely understated as to the volume of actual tied
aid. The implications of these ties suggested in their findings that the value of the
loans were reduced by 15 to 20 percent but was more likely a higher percentage
unaccounted, which intern reduced the quality of goods and services, higher and
inefficient given the true needs of the borrower (World Bank, 1985).

Financial flows that contribute to water infrastructure investments can have
benefits with the private sector and should not be overlooked because of
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inefficiencies of existing financial structures. Governments have used private
businesses to improve the access of water and sanitation services and experience
has shown that when the goals are managed among stakeholders that these
partnerships can overcome obstacles and achieve results (Payen, 2006).

2.6 How to Manage Donor Expectations
In discussing how to manage donor expectations within financing structures,
it is imperative to have new and existing donors with the coordination of the
borrowers and aid recipients to bring forth the discussions of funding, planning,
management and reporting systems to achieve the goals of the agreed upon water
project. These concerns are not just limited to the water sector and financing. In
examining the Global Fund that was established in 2002 to address health issues of
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and its designs of internal controls and
management systems of the funds infrastructure, participants acknowledged that it
had a high profile in servicing the recipients of aid to undertake the objectives of
the fund. However, these challenges of managing expectations were magnified by
the effect of weak health systems, limited capacity, and competing demands for
governments, partners and for the Global Fund itself (Brugha et al, 2004). There is
a need for transparent dialogue between stakeholders in managing expectations
with not only donors but all interested parties.
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CHAPTER 3
FINANCIAL STRUCTURES

There are four traditional forms of financing instruments used in the water
sector: grants, loans, equity, and debt (GTZ, 2006). The following forms are
defined as followed adapted from the “Financing Infrastructure in the Water and
Wastewater Sector” report compiled by GTZ:

• Grants: Facilitated through public budgets. Primary funders are
international donors to national governments to fund water sector
development. In turn national governments disperse the grant for national
sector priorities or allocate funds to local governments or utilities.

• Loans: Distributed to parties involved in the water sector from donors or
private investors through the banking system (national and international).

• Equity and Debt: Funds generated through the capital market facilitated
by private investors, governments and International Finance Institution
(IFIs) where they are allocated to municipalities or utilities in the water
sector. Donors have played a limited role in the use of equity and debt
instruments; however they are increasing their profile in these areas.

A breakdown of the sources of water sector financing mechanisms is further
illustrated in the following figure.
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Sources of Finance
Instruments
Donors and IFIs
 Grants
 Loans
Private Investors
 Loans
 Debt/equity
Public-Private partnerships
 Grants
 Loans
 Debt/equity

Intermediaries
Instruments
Public budgets
(budgetary finance)
Banking system
(bank lending)

Users of Finance
Instruments
National governments
 Grants
 Loans

Municipal governments
 Grants
Insurance market
(risk guarantee schemes)
 Loans
Guarantees
 Debt/equity
Capital market
(Investment agencies)

Utilities
 Grants
 Loans
 Debt/equity
 Tariff revenue
Table 3.1 Sources of Water Sector Financing Mechanisms (Source: GTZ, 2006)

A range of potential sources of financing and instruments is listed for potential
ways of meeting the demands of the lender-borrowers in the water sector (Cardone
and Fonseca, 2006)

-

User fees or tariffs

-

Domestic taxes

-

Grants

-

Loans

-

Micro-credit/micro-finance

-

Environmental charges

-

Dedicated or special purpose fund

-

Bond markets

-

Equity

-

Direct private investment
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-

Mixed credits and export funds

-

Voluntary finance schemes

-

Guarantees

-

Debt swaps

Most of these arrangements are based on the premise that the cost of recovery
will be absorbed from user’s representative of residential, commercial, industrial or
from the government. In order for the recipient to obtain funding they must
demonstrate credit worthiness, whereby they are required to exhibit appropriate
governance structures, recordkeeping of accounting, and financial documents,
historical cash flows, establish the means to manage the debt with past
performance along with any other economic considerations placed by the donor
(Cardone and Fonesca, 2006).

When there is a lack of adequate funding due to these financial barriers it can
create unintended consequences in the water markets. This is classified as the
“vicious downward spiral” by the CEO Panel (2003) and illustrated in the following
figure.
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Figure 3.1. Vicious Downward Spiral (Source: Moss et al, 2003)

Donors have various instruments available for financing, but primarily use
grants and loans. Additionally, donors can enter into a type of PPP providing
financing together with a private source. For the water sector specifically, 72% of
ODA financing comes from grants whereas the remaining 28% are derived from
loans (GTZ, 2006). From the donors reviewed in Chapter 2, Germany and France
are the predominant providers of loan ODA in the water sector. From the total
amount of loans provided between the period of 1997-2001, France provided 58%,
while Germany provided 36% (Clermont, 2006).

The majority of loans provided are for large-scale water supply and
sanitation projects. 72% of all loans provided between 1997 and 2001 were for
large-scale water supply and sanitation projects. While EC, Belgium, and Italy
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provided 100% of their loans for large-scale water supply and sanitation, and 100%
of loans from Spain were for water resources protection, France and Germany
provided loans to several sub-sectors such as small scale water supply and
sanitation, water resources management, river development, and agricultural water
resources, among others (GTZ, 2006).

There are many benefits of having donors provide financing opportunities
and assistance to other countries or groups in need. These benefits of foreign
assistance range from providing a constructive policy dialogue of policy changes,
promoting sufficient development, to facilitating financing in the markets (GTZ,
2006). As discussed in Chapter 2, the foreign assistance provided by donors can
create certain amount of dependence which is a negative incentive for donors to
promote self-sustainable solutions for the future. Focus should be given on
emphasizing policy reforms, developing flexible financing instruments that meet
precise objectives of the end-users and coordinate joint efforts as much as possible
where available (World Bank, 1985).

There is a movement by donors to reform their lending and financing
policies to expand financing options available to developing markets by suggesting
innovative and new financing tools. Other alternative financing policies include
using local banks as co-financers or intermediaries to improve the banking sector
and build financial capacity. The World Bank and IFC have created a Bank-IFC
Municipal Fund to assist in lending at the sub-sovereign level that does not require
sovereign guarantees (GTZ, 2006).
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3.1 Private Investment
The private finance water sector investment potential tends to be higher in
larger population centers where the risk is perceived to be much less when
considering the recovery cost of the venture. Areas of population under 500 that
are considered rural, household finance and microfinance are the preferred financing
option over traditional private financing because of the small size and scope of the
project (Baletti and Raymond, 2005). Some of the reasons for PPPs lack of
investments were compiled by the World Bank. It was noted that even though
more attractive investments may be presented to the private sector they generally
still will not materialize based on risk profiles and observance of market principles
chosen by the PPP. One reason cited by the World Bank was the preference of
PPPs having a strong bias for large size projects with high transaction costs. Other
considerations by PPPs included country settings and business climate conditions
where favor is given to countries with adequate sovereign risk ratings (Baletti and
Raymond, 2005).

From the report compiled by the World Bank, the following were listed as
reasons for lack of PPP in markets and is provided (Baletti and Raymond, 2005):



Capital intensity, with high, up-front investments combined with long
payback periods and low sector returns



Risk of political pressure on tariffs



Weak or inconsistent regulation, lack of transparency, and perceived risk of
regulatory capture
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Sub-sovereign risk – local government entities standing counterparty to bulk
water sale agreements while having a poor collection records, suboptimal
financial conditions, and weak credit



Water unaccounted for, water loss, inadequate distributions networks in a
state of disrepair, and the lack of investment funding to remedy the same
thus threatening long0term project viability



Foreign exchange risk, with mismatch between local currency revenues and
foreign currency financing



Forms of credit backstop (for example, sovereign counter-guarantees for
financial obligations of subnational entities being scaled back in the face of
decentralization, ratings agencies reviews and downgrades)



Lack of local government access to bank and capital markets due to absence
of central government authorization, and competition for scarce financial
resources



Aversion of private insurers and reinsurers to providing bond insurance and
political risk insurance to subnational entities in developing countries due to
lack of transparency, poor financial condition of reference entity, and
absence of credit rating.

In taking a closer look at financing potential in the private water markets, we
can observe the highest investments currently are needed in the rural and village
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communities (Baletti and Raymond, 2005). This is illustrated by the World Bank’s
Figure (Figure 3.2) for private sector potential in different water markets.

Figure 3.2. Private Sector Potential in Different WSS Markets. (Source: Baletti
and Raymond, 2005)

3.2 Innovative Financing – Looking Beyond Traditional Financing Flows
There is a need to manage existing and potential resources in a sustainable
manner that is accountable and manageable by all the stakeholders. What drives
innovative financing is the need for new financial resources and effective use of
those resources.
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The concept of innovative financing in the marketplace has recently emerged as
a creative way to meet the shortfalls of existing investment structures.

It

addresses the question of who can provide financing as well as how financing can
be supplied and demanded. The World Bank defines innovative financing as an
approach that meets three conditions (World Bank, 2010):

1. Generation of additional development funds by seeking new funding sources
or engaging with new partners

2. Enhancing the efficiency of financial flows that reduce delivery time and/or
costs, specifically for emergency needs and crisis situations; and

3. Creating more results-oriented financial flows that link funding flows to
measurable performance on the ground

These concepts are illustrated in Figure 3.3, showing the overlapping
opportunities of funding in the water market sector. By understanding these
overlapping

opportunities

there

can

be

more

effective

dialogue

between

stakeholder’s negotiations of the financial structures implemented for water
projects. These understandings are critical in designing the most appropriate and
efficient financing mechanisms that will mutually benefit the stakeholders.
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Figure 3.3. Innovating Financing Role for Water Projects (Source: World Bank,
2010)

The use of innovation has the ability to reduce pressures of existing resources
facilitating sustainable principals (Hemmelskamp, Rennings, & Leone, 2000).
Sources of potential innovative financing can include the following (Cardone and
Fonesca, 2006):

-

PRSC

-

Public-Private Partnerships (PPP)

-

MDG-based Planning

-

SWAP (donor funding)

-

Domestic financial intermediary
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o Local Banking Sector
o Microfinance
o Credit Cooperatives
-

Public Sector Financial Agencies
o Public Banks issuing loans to municipalities

In assessing the most practical and efficient financing strategy that is
sustainably viable, we can look towards the World Bank’s assessment of indicators
in the public and private sector to understand borrower’s options. Figure 3.4
illustrates these options at the various levels of PPP financing.

Figure 3.4. Financing Options at Different Levels of Financial Sustainability
(Source: Baletti and Raymond, 2005)
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We can use Table 3.2 to summarize the applied financial instruments of
their applicability and ideal targets for water projects.

It is important to

determine these factors so that they are not overlooked in available financing or
concerns of the PPP sector, which then can contribute to designing stakeholder
perspectives for tasked to address all the likely challenges facing stakeholders.
These concerns should not be limited to just only these concerns, but rather
initiate the discussion of all potential concerns in question.
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Financing Instruments

Grants

Donor loans

Bank loans

Micro-finance loans

Equity

Municipal Bonds

Private finance (loans,
debt or equity)

Pooled financing and
revolving funds

Guarantees

Appropriate for What Local Conditions

Non-performing utilities; absence of local
financial market; weak national government
with limited fiscal decentralization. Grant
financing best used as a tool to support the
involvement of the poor, to build capacity for
sub-sovereign and private sector water actors;
provide initial start-up capital for community
funds, revolving loans and other types of
funds for the water sector.
Can be applied to many actors within a
country in different ways.
Innovative: loans to sub-sovereigns or private
sector (particularly to build commercial or
institutional lending capacity)’ lending in local
currency
Stable financial market with clear legal
framework and repayment capacity of
borrower; regulatory body to ensure effective
tariffs; stable utility balance sheet
Community participation and capacitybuilding; provision of start-up capital;
community monitoring
Can be applied only to a public LTD or
private utility – need a shareholder board in
place. Fiscal decentralization, stable or
developing financial market with clear legal
framework
Sufficient debt capacity of local government;
security mechanism for purchasers of bond
(guarantee mechanism development of
secondary market to sell bond for example);
capacity in municipality to successfully design
and administer bond; minimum municipal
credit rating BBB of higher, positive market
conditions
Sound legal and regulatory framework;
guarantee schemes to protect investors;
guarantees against sovereign risk, foreign
exchange risk; low transaction cost thresholds;
capacity-building of domestic private sector in
some cases; stability cash flow
Pooling is favorable where conditions are not
yet ripe for commercial lending or private
investors, as individual company balance
sheets may be weak. Need a project planning
cycle in place; clear default and loan
guidelines; combination of stronger and
weaker borrowers; initial start-up capital for
loan
Guarantees for agencies to work in higher risk
projects/sectors; guarantees and lines of credit
to domestic banks (could be provided from
donor finance, private sector, national
government, etc.) as well as private sector to
encourage involvement sector

Target (water user,
national/local
government, community,
utility, etc.)

Local government;
utility

National and municipal
governments

National and municipal
governments
Local community utility;
user

Utility

Municipal government

Local government;
utility

Local governments

Private sector, banks

Table 3.2. Summary of Applied Financial Instruments and Applicability (Source:
GTZ, 2006)
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CHAPTER 4
END-USERS, RECIPIENTS AND BORROWERS

Local communities and groups have the most at stake with water resources
and the underlying theme is effective management to their overall sustainability
(Brooks, 2002). Individuals, villages, communities, and governments are necessary
stakeholders to establish efficient, equitable and sustainable water resource
management. When providing basic water services such as water supply,
sanitation, waste treatment, and sewage for urban and rural areas, it will begin
with the end-users and communities (Van Hofwegen, 2006). As discussed in
Chapter 2, donors have tasked themselves to meet the challenges of the MDGs set
forth by the UNDEP for water compiled in 2003.

UN global estimate of
those without access
By 2015, this number
would grow to at least
The International
Development Target is to
reduce this by half by
2015
This means that each year
for the next 13 years, the
following have to be
connected
This means that roughly
each day for the next 13
years, the following have
to be connected
Table 4.1. Targets to meet
2003)

Water
1.2 billion

Sanitation
2.5 billion

1.5 billion

3 billion

750 million

1.5 billion

57.692 million

115.385 million

158,601

316,122

Millennium Development Goals (Source: Moss et al,
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From the review of donors in Chapter 2, the majority of ODA commitments
of water investments are mainly derived from bilateral donors. Of the list compiled
by the OECD of the 30 donors, 60% of monies stem from four donors and 80%
originates from eight donors. Figure 4.2 is the analysis of ODA recipients from
donors distributed aid from 1990-2004 (Van Hofwegen, 2006).

France

AsDF

Netherlands

Denmark

UK

Others (20 donors)

Total

Percentage

126
36
5
47
1

11
15
15
5
4
30
24
12

2
0,3
77
0,03
0,2
0,03
1
39

5
12
19
7
3
7
19
4

1
2
4
0,1
2
5
18
3

29
-

19
5
7
5
6
0,003
1

2
3
4
6
1
-

19
4
10
0,4
0,1
3

10
28
11
17
13
0,5
4
6

257
251
168
150
104
102
83
71

8,1
8,0
5,3
4,8
3,3
3,2
2,6
2,3

56
8
4
4
44
0,01
9
28
17
2
45
43
251

18
21
16
5
9
161

2
20
0,1
5
13
0,2
2
2
19
8
0,3
0,1
156

0,4
29
2
0,1
0,2
57
0,02
0,02
0,03
0,04
0,04
21

1
2
2
3
2
3
2
14
1
0,2
0,2
107

1
0,1
3
0,002
1
0,3
3
3
111

4
9
26
15
32

1
0,1
9
3
0,3
0,1
1
0,2
1
4
0,0002
46

2
10
11
0,1
3
4
1
43

1
6
6
0,1
1
1
1
1
0,1
0,1
31

3
4
5
10
3
3
2
2
1
19
1
2
298

69
66
65
65
62
61
61
57
54
50
47
45
1226

2,2
2,1
2,1
2,1
2,0
1,9
1,9
1,8
1,7
1,6
1,5
1,5
1,4

912
28,9

445
14,1

362
11,5

229
7,3

211
6,7

157
5,0

115
3,7

108
3,4

90
2,8

84
2,7

443
14,0

3156

40,1

EC

USA

62
146
15
34
75
50
17
3

Germany

IDA

India
China
Egypt
Vietnam
Indonesia
Turkey
Morocco
Palest. Adm.
Areas
Philippines
Jordan
Bangladesh
Ghana
Peru
Iraq
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Tunisia
Tanzania
Thailand
Mexico
Others (154
recipients)
Total
Percentage

Japan

Receivers

Donors

Table 4.2. Principal Donors and Recipients of ODA for Water, in Average Annual
Commitments for the Period 1990-2004 (millions of 2003 constant US
Dollars)(Source: Van Hofwegen, 2006)
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In assessing the perceptions of the needs and wants of the end-users or
recipients of water it becomes evident that the more successful the good or service
is delivered, the higher the probability it will be taken for granted (Moss et al,
2003). A Maslow hierarchy of needs was constructed by the CEO Panel in 2003
and the following Figure 4.3 illustrates the water needs of users.

Figure 4.1. What People Want with Water (Source: Moss et al, 2003)

Given that the value of water will vary from use, to users, and places,
market values are not the same as pricing because people will always have different
values. These differences of values range from small to large known as “value
divides” (Moss et al, 2003). These value divides between stakeholders are
important, because they must be aligned in some manner, if sustainable water
management solutions are to be found. By understanding that solutions that do
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not all have a consensus will not prevail in the long-term, because stakeholders will
undermine the process along with political shifts (Moss et al, 2003).

The way

people value water is based on a variety of factors that constantly evolve and
necessitate collaboration between the stakeholders (Brooks, 2002).

Using a full-cost approach to pricing of water infrastructure, that is, the
consumers are charged the full cost of water services from use to collection,
treatment and wastewater disposal to recognize the full value of water with the
cost of externalities should be developed based on the stakeholder’s valuation of
water and overall objectives of the project (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000). It was
noted in the proceedings of a local workshop in Katmandu in financing water
harvesting schemes that users themselves were obligated to provide funds for local
construction whether by contributions of cash, in-kind, or labor for the project and
often times were built by the users themselves. The maintenance and organizations
would then fall to the responsibility of the users as well (Banskota and Chalise,
2000). “This approach to valuing water will encourage infrastructure investments
and private sector involvement and provide the revenue to cover the costs of
operation and maintenance” (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000, p. 2).

There is no practical sense of a “best practice” policy for water resource
management. “This is because the world is heterogeneous, with different cultures,
social norms, climatic patterns, skewed availability of water and financial resources,
management

capacities,

institutional

structures

and

levels

of

corruption”

(Tortajada and Biswas, 2011, p.9). Given that these values vary amid stakeholders
in varying degrees, it is fundamental to construct a framework to conceive these
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values. The CEO Panel (2003) designed a “water dialogue space” pattern
representing the value perspectives and stakeholders to aid in the construction of
identifying common ground for value differences and divides (Moss et al, 2003) as
illustrated in Figure 4.2 and 4.3.

Figure 4.2. Dialogue Space and Value Perspectives (Source: Moss et al, 2003)
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Figure 4.3. Dialogue Space and Stakeholders (Source: Moss et al, 2003)

The panel furthered the pattern with a stakeholder mapping progression for
stimulating the process of valuing water and water governance amongst the water
sector. The first step in the blueprint is to identify water users where the services
and activities can then be outlined. The third step identifies the subject to ideas
and prevailing interests of the stakeholders. These spheres are overlapping and can
identify potential challenges of conflict, improve dialogue discussions and
strengthen common interests amongst the stakeholders. The last step of the system
yields shared outcomes for society, environment, and economy, which are essential
to sustainable development. This platform provides a framework for identifying the
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relative rights, roles and responsibilities of stakeholders when addressing water
challenges (Moss et al, 2003).

Users / Customers
Domestic
Industrial
Commercial
Agriculture
Etc.
Organiser/Governor
Operator/Supplier
Mayor
Employees
Municipal Administration
Subcontractors
Regulators
Suppliers
State Authorities
Financiers
Etc.
Etc.
Figure 4.4. Mapping Stakeholders – Step 1 (Source: Moss et al, 2003)

Figure 4.5. Mapping Stakeholders – Step 2. (Source: Moss et al, 2003)
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Figure 4.6. Mapping Stakeholders – Step 3. (Source: Moss et al, 2003)
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Figure 4.7. Mapping Stakeholders – Step 4. (Source: Moss et al, 2003)

It has been observed by the International Development Research Centre
(IDRC) that “smaller and less complicated approaches are more likely to be
adopted and put to lasting use than grand designs of integrated resource
management” (Brooks, 2002).
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CHAPTER 5
HOW TO OPTIMIZE WATER FINANCING

Water crisis historically is viewed from the imbalance of water supply and
demand but should include the pervasive gaps of economic and institutional
dimensions of water resource development, allocation, use, and management to
properly design, initiate, and sustain these changes within the ongoing debate of
water, both nationally and internationally (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). ODA has
faced trends of losses in the 1990s after gains in the 1970s and 1990s and recent
gains in 2000. The following Figure5.1 demonstrates these trends for the period
between 1971 and 2006:

Figure 5.1. Official development assistance in billion $ to the water supply and
sanitation sector from 1971 to 2006. (Source: UNESCO, 2009)
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These economic trends of increases and declines result from the inefficient
use of water resources, poor management, and water shortages along with the
increasing environmental and financial costs associated with managing water
(Saleth and Dinar, 2004). Even if new solutions were applied such as technology, it
still is not enough to overcome the challenges in the current models of water
resource management (Frerot, 2011). Given that the financial and economic
contributions largely contribute to the success in this sector, the answers lie within
the framework of water policies, water technology, and water financing which
shape the design and implementation of the water resources (Saleth and Dinar,
2004). In the following, three currently used frameworks for water projects are
reviewed and a novel framework for sustainable water financing is proposed.

5.1 Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM)
IWRM is a decision making tool for development and management of water
resources for a variety of uses, that takes into account the needs and desires of
numerous stakeholders and users, giving governance and sustainability of water
systems (Van Hofwegen and Jaspers, 1999).

It was developed by the Inter-

American Development Bank (IDB) to address financing issues, which have been
largely overlooked by literature in the water governance and sector development.
(Rees, Winpenny and Hall, 2008). The analytical framework of IRWM is presented
in Figure 5.1. It has been proposed that, feedback loops should be used to include
interaction with finance, where considerations are made with whom and how to
finance for the present and the future. Presently finance is considered a missing
component of IWRM plans or is referenced for increased demands, when the
argument could be made that every country or benefactor has the need for
additional financing (Rees, Winpenny and Hall, 2008). Infrastructure planning that
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gives consideration to the dynamics of financing will be more likely to generate
adequate funding and maintain the credibility amongst constituents. The
framework presented in this thesis was therefore tailored to be able to allow for
dynamic and flexible financing in order to resolve the challenges of current water
financing.

Figure 5.2. Analytical Framework for Integrated Water Resource Management
(IWRM). (Source: Van Hofwegen and Jaspers, 1999)
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5.2 OECD
The OECD is claimed to be the most experienced international organization
with financing strategies in the water sector since the 1990s and has been at the
forefront of these discussions at conferences, publishing books, and policy briefs on
the matter (COWI, 2007).

For the purposes of this thesis, the OECD water

financing applied framework and methodology will be examined as the foundation
for the qualitative framework proposed in this chapter.

5.2.1 SMART TARGETS
The OECD created a financing strategy that established SMART: Specific,
Measureable, Agreed, Realistic and Time-bound, so that these targets are
incorporated in the public budget where they can be regularly monitored and
evaluated (EUWI, 2007). The OECD methodology places its focus on the
operational costs and the ability of the users to pay the operational costs directly
associated with the service level desired (EUWI, 2007). OECD methodology does
not focus on the project level but rather the strategic and program levels (EUWI,
2007). The SMART framework is the foundation for the development of the
quantitative tool FEASIBLE, which forecasts what a water project would cost
taking into account the likelihood of available funds (EUWI, 2010).
5.3 FEASIBLE
Financing for Environmental, Affordable and Strategic Investments that
Bring on Large-scale Expenditure Model (FEASIBLE) was designed in 1999 as a
collaboration between the OECD and COWI, a consultant firm specializing in
engineering, environmental science, and economics (OECD, 1999). FEASIBLE
initially started out as an excel spreadsheet and has evolved into a computer-based
tool that considers the expenditure needs (in terms of investment and operation
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and management expenditure needs) to meet specific and time bound targets of
financing by grants, loans, user charges, and public subsidies. The expenditures can
be applied to water supply, wastewater, and sanitation or waste sector projects
(Fonseca, Dube and Verhoeven, 2011).

FEASIBLE uses generic cost functions to establish investment and
operation with maintenance expenditure needs based on inputs from existing
physical infrastructure and the future physical infrastructure desired to meet the
intended targets (Fonseca, Dube and Verhoeven, 2011). Costs functions can be
adapted with local relative prices or default values for the scenario along with
infrastructure values for regions or municipalities. Debt terms and services can be
specified to borrowing terms which can then be cross-examined with user charges
to determine affordability. This comparison determines where financing gaps exist
between the expenditures needs given by a set of goals with available financing
(OECD, 2004).

The FEASIBLE financial gap results imply (DANCEE and OECD, 2004):

1. Future supply of finance assumptions from user charges,
public budgets and donors are insufficient for the scope of
the project; or

2. The scope of the future service level is elaborate or beyond
the limits of future supply or financing; or

3. A combination of (1) and (2)
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The FEASIBLE model has four main components (DANCEE and OECD,
2004):

1. General

Information:

information

pertaining

to

the

geographic area, region, municipality, and groups of
municipalities with the basic macro-economic data of the
scenario.

2. Expenditures: projected environmental expenditures that
include

operation

and

maintenance,

reinvestments,

renovations and new investments in infrastructure that are
based on current situations and service level targets of users.

3. Finance Supply: existing and future supply of finance from
user charges, public budgets, loans, and grants.

4. Financing gaps/results: aggregated results on financing gaps
and

selected

technical

parameters

are

available

for

assessments.

Based on the inputs, FEASIBLE creates a baseline scenario to evaluate and
establish strategic development. The structure of FEASIBLE is illustrated in
Figure 5.3 and the methodology overview of FEASIBLE is presented in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.3. Structure of FEASIBLE (EUWI, 2010)
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Figure 5.4. Methodology overview of FEASIBLE Source: OECD, 2007

5.4 Proposed Model – Optimization of Water Financing (OWF)
The above discussed models approach financing mechanisms in ways that
costs are being calculated. The purpose of the herein proposed Optimization of
Water Financing (OWF) model is to create flexible financing terms through a
feedback loop system that uses the most current or real-time depiction of a life
cycle analysis (LCA) of the water project. The financing terms will be linked to the
LCA results through the on-going feedback loops within the model which can be
continuously modified to mutually benefit the stakeholders.

In order to meet the above objectives, the OWF uses the System Dynamics
(SD) method for the LCA of the water project. Thus far the application of SD in
financing of the water sector has only been considered within the last few years and
only within the scope of research papers. Bianchi and Montemaggiore (Bianchi and
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Montemaggiore, 2008) used SD for strategic design and planning for a project in a

municipal water company. Their case study shows that SD can significantly
improve the planning process, identification of causal relationships between policy
and performance. It further helps to better communicate strategy with
stakeholders, handling the demand profile and seasonality factors. In a recent paper
by Rehan et al. (Rehan et al, 2011) the authors use a SD approach to develop a
demonstration model for water and wastewater network management that is
financially self-sustainable over the long-run. The authors find that existing
infrastructure management systems and tool are not sustainable and that a SD
approach is a viable method for modeling the management of water and
wastewater networks. The strength of using SD lies in particular in the ability to
model complex systems with many interconnections and feedback loops (Rehan et
al, 2011). SD can resolve common shortcomings of models like unidirectional
causality that for example is unable to distinguish delays between actions and their
impact on performance (Akkermans and van Oorschot, 2005). SD has been found
to be a well-grounded, flexible and realistic approach to deal with uncertainties in
water resource management (WRM) and therefore provides a crucial tool in
adaptive management thereof (Winz, Brierley, & Trowsdale, 2009). In the
following the basics of SD will be reviewed and the methodology of OWF
discussed.

5.4.1 System Dynamics
System Dynamics (SD) is a method used to describe the behavior of
complex systems over time. It was developed in the 1950 th by Jay W. Forrester at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Forrester, 2007) and finds wide ranging
applications in the fields of management, engineering, and computer science.
Systems dynamics can furthermore play a role in making strategic decisions (Gary,
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Kunc, Morecroft & Rockart, 2008). SD uses chains of relationships that are
constructed based on physical flows (cash, materials, etc.) and information flows
(Wolsenholme, 1982). The foundation of SD is rooted in systems that are each
linked through conditions of system variables, which are unknown variables from
identified conditions of other system variables. This creates an environment of
uncertainty that is adapted into our mathematical model to describe the random
nature of the development of stakeholder interests.

Both qualitative and quantitative analysis is used in our approach, as
illustrated in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. Figure 5.5 shows the generalized SD approach
adapted from E. F. Wolstenholme (1982 and 1983).
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System Description:
Qualitative Analysis
1. Current Financial
Models
2. Using physical,
cash, and
information flows
3. Examine water
financing feedback
loop structure

To provide:
(i) A perspective on
water financing or
symptoms of the
water financing
market
(ii) A qualitative
analysis on which
to base
recommendations
for water financing
change

Quantified Analysis Using Continuous Simulation
Techniques
Stage 1
Stage II
Stage III
1. Examine the
Examine
Optimize
behavior of all
alternative
system
system variables
structures and
parameters
over time.
control policies
2. Examine the
base on:
validity and
(i) Intuitive
sensitivity of the
ideas;
model to changes in:
(ii) Control
(i) Structure;
theory
(ii) Policies
analogies;
(iii) Delays and
(iii) Control
uncertainties
theory
algorithms
Provide a quantified assessment of alternative ways of
improving system performance

Figure 5.5. Systems Dynamic Approach for Water Resource Financing –
Optimization Framework (adapted from Systems Dynamic Methodology,
Wolstenholme, 1983)

When applied to water financing, the three stages of the quantitative
analysis can be modeled as depicted in Figure 5.6.
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Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Water
Definition of: Definition and application of Definition and
Financing
• Objectives relevant modeling techniques: implementation of:
• Mathematical models
• Performance
• Variables
measure
• Financing instruments
• Feedback loops
• Expenditure models
• Feedback control
Figure 5.6. Stages of Systems Dynamic Methodology for Water Financing Sector
(Adapted from Systems Dynamic Methodology, Wolstenholme, 1983)

For the implementation of the framework, a mathematical optimization
method called Optimal Control Theory (OCT) is used. The objective of OCT is to
determine a control function that will cause a process to satisfy constraints and at
the same time minimize (or maximize) a performance measure (Kirk, 1970). This
can be achieved by usage of a closed-loop feedback control structure as
schematically shown in Figure 5.7. The usage of a feedback structure allows for
controlling complex and dynamic systems that change over time. In Figure 5.7 the
“controller” and the “system” are connected such that they both influence each
other. Through the “measurement” component the state of the system can be
compared to the desired state. By feeding this information back into the loop,
corrective actions can be taken to approach the desired state of the system.
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Figure 5.7. Basic Feedback Control Theory (Texample.net, 2006)

It is this basic feedback loop structure that is adapted in this thesis to
create an optimal water financing framework.

5.4.2 OWF Methodology
The OWF feedback loop structure is depicted in Figure 5.8 and makes use of the
following variables:

1. r = reference, which is the ideal outcome of a water project
2. u = variation of control variables
3. y = performance parameter being measured
4. e = error (reference – actual)
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Figure 5.8. OWF Feedback Control Theory

In the schematic, the reference (r), defines the input parameters describing
the ideal outcome of a water project, as determined by stakeholder interests.
Through the input point (e), the parameters enter the controller which controls the
variation of control variables (u) that regulate the water project. The measured
output (y), describes the actual state of the system, which is fed into the sensor.
The sensor compares the actual state of the system with the desired state and
computes the error (e), which is then fed into the controller to change the control
parameters to minimize the error. The loop is continuously repeated, allowing the
system to approach the ideal outcome.

The feedback control structure can be implemented using the method of
Dynamic Programming (DP), which leads to a functional equation that can be
solved by a computer (Kirk, 1970). DP is widely used in engineering to determine
the control signals that will cause a process to satisfy the physical constraints and
at the same time minimize or maximize the performance criterion (Kirk, 1970).
Differential equations are used to find the optimum control function that
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maximizes the performance. For the purpose of the OWF framework optimal
control using ordinary differential equations (ODE) and stochastic differential
equations (SDE) are considered.

In the following we will discuss the basic

framework of the two approaches. The description of the ODEs is based on the
“Optimal Control Theory” written by Kirk (Kirk, 1970), while we refer to the
lecture by Evans from UC Berkley (Evans, 1983) for SDEs.

Optimal control using ODE can be achieved using the Hamilton-JacobiBellman equation which is a non-linear partial differential equation. The control
function of the OWF can be described by the state equation (Kirk, 1970):

̇( )

( ( )

( ) ) (Eq. 5.1)

With x(t) being the state vector of the system and u(t) the control vector.
The state equation is to be controlled to maximize or minimize the performance
measure (Kirk, 1970):
( ( )

)

( ( )

∫

( ) )

(Eq. 5.2)

where h and g are specified functions, t 0 and tf are fixed, and  is a dummy
variable of integration (Kirk, 1970). In order to determine the function that for
example minimizes J, the following equation needs to be solved (Kirk, 1970):

( ( ) )

{∫

( ( ) ( ) )
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( ( )

)} (Eq. 5.3)

After applying Bellman’s optimality principal, this equation yields the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, whose solution gives us the optimal
feedback control (Kirk, 1970):

( ( ) )

( ( )

( ( )

)

) (Eq. 5.4)

The solution of the HJB equation yields J*, which is the optimum value of
our performance measure. In order to find the optimal solution, we will need to
find the control law that minimizes the performance measure, J. In order to do so
we must first specify a performance measure, which is a mathematical expression of
all terms that need to be minimized. Using J and the Hamiltonian H, defined as
(Kirk, 1970):

( ( )

( )

)

( ( )

( ) )

( ( ) )[ ( ( )

( ) )] (Eq. 5.5)

In case of an unconstrained control, the necessary condition that the
optimal control must satisfy is (Kirk, 1970):

From this equation we can derive u*(t), the optimal control function. The
control function can then be substituted in the HJB equation. Furthermore, the
boundary value for the partial differential equation (PDE) can be found by setting
t = tf. From Eq. 5.3, it is apparent that the boundary condition I (Kirk, 1970)s:
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( ( )

)

( ( )

) (Eq. 5.6)

One way to solve the HJB equation is to guess a form for the solution to see
if it can be modified or adjusted to satisfy the differential equation and the
boundary conditions. Once the solution is found then the optimal control law can
be specified (Kirk, 1970). While this approach is viable for simple cases, one is
generally unable to find a solution this easily. In general the HJB equation must be
solved by numerical techniques. Such techniques that involve an approximation to
the exact optimization will be employed in the OWF, as discussed in Chapter 6.

The second method is the use of controlled SDEs. The following is based on
the lecture notes of Evans (Evans, 2011). SDEs differ from ODEs in that they
contain a “white noise” term that causes random fluctuations (Evans, 2011).
Stochastic dynamic programming is of particular importance, as it provides
reasonable solutions to account for uncertainties of water resource systems planning
(Luo, 2007). A SDE can be written as (Evans, 2011)

( )

( ( )

( ))

( )

(Eq. 5.7)

The expected payoff functional has the form (Evans, 2011)

[ ( )]

{∫

( ( )

( ))

( ( ))} . (Eq. 5.8)

In contrast to the deterministic model discussed earlier, the stochastic
functional contains an expectation value E that describes the random nature of P
(Evans, 2011).
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The value function can be defined as (

)

[ ( )]

Simply, we are obtaining the supremum (maximum) of P, our payoff
function. In order to do so, the method of dynamic programming can be employed.
The first step is to find a PDE that is satisfied by v, which is then used to design
an optimal control u* (Evans, 1983).

To find a solution we consider that u is any control function that is used for
the time interval t    t+h and that the optimal control function is used
thereafter. Then

(

)

( ( )

{∫

( ))

( (

)

)} (Eq. 5.9)

In the case of optimal control the inequality becomes equality, if we take
u()= u*(). To find the differential of Eq. 5.9, Itos chain rule (see for example
Evan, 1983) can be used to yield:

( ( ) )

( ( ) )

( ))

(

(Eq. 5.10)

Plugging Eq. 5.10 into Eq. 5.9 one derives

{∫

( ( ( )

( ))

( ( ) )

(Eq. 5.11)

62

(

( ))

)

}

Dividing Eq. 5.11 by h and letting h approach 0 (h  0) one obtains the
stochastic HJB equation:

{

}

(Eq. 5.12)

Hence, the value function v(x,t) has been shown to solve the HJB PDE.

The solution of the stochastic HJB equation yields v(x,t), the optimum
value of the payoff functional P. The goal is to find the control law that maximizes
the performance measure, P. In case of an unconstrained control, the necessary
condition that the optimal control must satisfy is:

( ( ( )

( ))

( ( )

( )))

(Eq. 5.13)

As discussed for the ODE, we can derive u*(t), the optimal control function.
The control function can then be substituted in the HJB equation. Furthermore,
the boundary value for the PDE can be found by setting t = tf. From Eq. 5.8, it is
apparent that the boundary condition is (Evans, 2011):

(

)

[ ( )]
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( ( )) (Eq. 5.14)

In Chapter 6, the functionality of optimal feedback control will be
demonstrated using a simplified model that is stochastic and controllable using a
PID controller to achieve ideal optimal performance. For the optimum OWF
model, the simplified model needs to be expanded using the OTC and dynamic
programming.

In either case, the inputs and outputs of OWF need to use indicators to
determine the parameters to measure. OWF adapts indicators from the
International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET)
Toolkit. A detailed description of each indicator is attached as Appendix B. The
following is a list of indicators given by IBNET (2011):

- Service coverage

- Quality of Service

- Water consumption and production

- Billings and collections

- Non revenue water

- Financial Performance

- Metering practices

- Assets
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- Pipe network performance

- Affordability of services

- Costs and Staffing

- Process indicators

These indicators should be initiated and compiled by the borrower or enduser first with the appropriate stakeholders who then facilitate a discussion to
negotiate the financing terms with the lender which also may occur with the
collaboration of an NGO or charitable organization. The results from the
inputs/outputs of the indicators then can create a simulated cash flow for the
borrower and lender that are optimized for efficient flexible financing terms with
feedback loops. Examples of this information feedback between stakeholders is
illustrated in Figure 5.9
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Figure 5.9. Information Feedback between Stakeholders (Source: Cap-Net, GWP,
& EUIW, 2008)

The goals of financing OWF for the end-user stakeholders ultimately are to
have water paying for water, and only water (Cap-Net, GWP, & EUIW, 2008).
Other targets adapted from the EU Water Imitative (EUWI) with the Global
Water Partnership and Cap-Net of the UN economic sustainability of water
management framework includes:

-

Ensuring sufficient revenue to deliver services in the long term

-

Ensuring sufficient revenues supporting improved quality of services

-

Ensuring sufficient revenues extending service coverage, specifically
to low-income consumers
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-

Ensuring better use of scarce water resource and management of
wastewater disposal conserving the natural environment

Additionally the training guide cited external and internal factors that
should be monitored on an ongoing basis for sustainability of water resource
management listed in Table 5.1

External Factors
 Government support
 Autonomy
 Understanding of external risks
 Understanding of economic base

Internal Factors
 Financial and credit management
 Management quality/capacity
 Operational performance
 Strategic planning and internal
transformation
 Human resources and utilization
of private sector
 Customer relations

Table 5.1. Internal and external factors to support utility transformation
(Source: Cap-Net, GWP, & EUIW, 2008)

The importance of this analysis of this methodology, OWF, provides
guidance in moving from “what is” to “what should be” in determining the
objectives of the methodology (Wolstenholme, 1983).
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Reference Input
Which costs must be covered?

Objective
Payment, cash
Purchase of hardware and tools
Running costs for project
System expansion
Financing repayment

Which funds should be used?

Community contributions
User contributions
Interest from community savings
External funds (donors, NGOs, national
governments, etc.)
Flat tariffs irrespective of amount used
Flat tariff per consumer where payments
depend of the number of persons in the
household; not amount used
Tariff per unit of water drawn
Low tariff for low-income households
High tariff for high income households
Low tariff for the first few units per person
with higher tariff for subsequent units per
person
User contributions to establish a separate
water project funded deposit account
User fees through metered connections,
payments at the water point or
weekly/monthly payment to the treasurer
Submitting proposals for external funding
Monthly
At the beginning of the fiscal year
As and when required
After a crop or other productive activity
Analyses causes of cash flow non-payments
Restructure cash flow payments
Improve services
Determine if and when to cut losses
Community account
Dedicated account in a bank
In objects that can serve as investment
Receipts for accounting
Financial control
Authorization to draw money from the bank
account
Comments and recommendations of the
users
Community committee
Community accountant
External accountant
In cash or in-kind
After a task has been fulfilled
On a monthly basis
Every year, after a crop or other productive
activity

Which tariffs should be used?

How to collect contributions?

When is an appropriate time to collect
contributions?
What to do in a default scenario?

Where funds should be deposited?
What should be taken into consideration to
administer the funds?

Who should administer the funds?
How to pay for staff for are responsible for
operations and management

Figure 5.10. Elements of Financing Mechanisms in OWF (Adapted from Cap-Net,
GWP, & EUIW, 2008)
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CHAPTER 6
THEORETICAL CASE MODEL AND MATHEMATICAL MODEL

In this chapter the inputs and outputs of the OWF model are discussed
based on a case model. Furthermore, the feasibility of the OWF model discussed in
Chapter 5 is demonstrated using a simplified model. In particular, the ability of the
model to react to the random fluctuation of inputs and the use of feedback control
to optimize the performance, as defined by the stakeholders, is shown. Furthermore
we demonstrate how the OWF model could mitigate potential shortfalls and
challenges of the project to make it more financially sustainable.

6.1 Water Project Selection
For the foundation of the theoretical case model a water project carried out
by Enersol, a non-profit organization working with water pumps powered by
renewal energy sources in the Dominican Republic since 1993 was used. Enersol
works with the Associate for the Development of Solar Energy (ADESOL) to
develop projects in rural communities.

Using the case study based on Enersol’s model for renewable energy for
rural community water supply, the proposed water project suggests that a solar
powered water pumping system with water treatment and water holding tank
system should be used (Graham and Johnson, 2000). This decision was also derived
by considering site selection parameters based on the technical note by Charey et
al (Chaurey, et al, 1993). Solar furthermore was chosen over gas and wind as it is
economically and logistically more favorable, as corroborated by a case study by
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Cloutier (Cloutier, 2011). Solar pump systems have been proven to be reliable,
cost-efficient, and to deliver high performance (Meah, 2006). Solar systems have a
higher upfront cost that can be handled financially by designing parameters of a
cash flow that take advantage of user’s willingness to pay (Singh, et al, 1993).

For water projects using renewal energy sources the size and feasibility of a
system design is driven by 3 parameters (Graham and Johnson, 2000):

1. The daily water demand
2. The vertical distance water is pumped
3. The availability of renewable energy resources

A sample case is taken from Enersol and ADESOL’s work, where the feasibility
of the above parameters is given. The case is examined and its inputs are adapted
into the OWF model framework. The case community will be called Esperanza for
our sample case.

6.2 Esperanza Profile
Esperanza’s initial population is 237. The local access to water is critical
because of the surrounding arid areas and poor surface water that require on
average two and half hours or more to obtain access to drinking water (Source:
Graham and Johnson, 2000). Table 6.1 lists the assumed systems parameters of the
desired water project:
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Parameter
Daily water demand

Assumption
Approximately 30 liters per person per day. Water for
household uses only.
Insolation (energy source) 5 kWh per m2 per day
Water storage capacity
3 days minimum
Distribution system
Metered-pay
Population growth
2% annually
Table 6.1. Design parameters of Esperanza project (adapted from Graham and
Johnson, 2000)

The base case model stipulated ADESOL would maintain ownership of the
water pumping equipment and the power source (solar modules) with the use of
tariffs to manage the costs of the system.

Using

the

general

approach

of

ADESOL’s

project

development

for

implementation, the following steps were taken (Source: Graham and Johnson,
2000):

1. Community visits to evaluate the feasibility of project
2. Perform studies as necessary to determine project feasibility
3. Meetings with community to discuss conditions of a feasible project
4. Wait for community to make a decision
5. Hold workshops to assist community with development of a water
board
6. Develop water well
7. Develop civil works
8. Install photovoltaic (PV) system with local solar support
9. Inaugurate water system
10. Post-installation technical assistance
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The community’s responsibilities included:

1. Daily system operation
2. Maintenance of civil works
3. Collection of monthly payments
i. Insurance policy
ii. Financed payments

6.3 Esperanza System Challenges and Design
The Esperanza project faces several challenges pertaining to site selection,
appropriate technology, water quality standards, community participation, and
adequate financing. By utilizing the water dialogue space between stakeholders for
the process of valuing water and governance from Chapter 4, these challenges can
be discussed and managed among the stakeholders for sustainable development.
Because communities are ever changing and dynamic, financial flexibility must be
inherent in both the physical aspects of the project, as well as the financing model
applied. In simulating the mapping process of stakeholders detailed in Chapter 3,
and using Enersol’s Esperanza project (Source: Graham and Johnson, 2000) as the
case study, the following challenges to determine the assumptions and decisions of
our base case were established:

1. Site selection: the community was able to properly identify a
location for the project with sufficient infrastructure to support the
system. Site location determined adequate well resources to avoid
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previous issues of wells running dry and additional costs in
generating new wells for failed wells.
2. Appropriate technology: the selection of a PV system requires less
technical knowledge and maintenance or repairs but should account
for reputation of technology. Reliability of manufacture product
information is needed for reasonable maintenance and repairs of
equipment and materials.
3. Costs of systems: the majority of the system, over the course of its
lifetime, is up-front. Incremental costs usually account for 15-25%
of the total life cycle costs. Cost recovery and planning for longterm care of the system is an integral part of designing a feasible
water system.
4. Technical designs: typical PV systems tend to require less technical
knowledge. However, technical materials are generally difficult to
find locally when problems arise with the PV systems that either
requires a minor repair that a local technician can handle or a
system component replacement. A new set of skills were needed for
the installation pumps, controllers and module systems. The
construction of civil works required further skills as well as training.
5. System maintenance: PV systems usually involve less maintenance
and repairs compared to traditional groundwater well pump
designs. Maintaining adequate supply of parts and materials is
needed to account for balancing the annual costs.
6. Timescales: timing of project review, design and implementation
was an important factor in selecting the ideal water project. The
water system was chosen to account for development of a budget
plan for realistic time frames. The most difficult areas were
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centered on the required time necessary to implement the system,
community participation and development of payment of the
financing model.
7. Price of water service: In determining the ideal method of billing
for users, a meter-payment option was selected to manage water
use by the residents for controlling waste and minimizing water
losses. By selecting this method of billing the willingness to pay
(WTP) can ideally meet the water demand to reach the true costs
of the water system. The WTP depends on the user’s monthly
household income and is a critical factor in meeting the financial
obligations of the debt service.
8. Water quality: past water quality results have not met household
consumption standards. Due to the poor quality users choose not to
consume enough water to support the investment of the project
which significantly lowered the WTP. Water quality testing and
monitoring is included in the project design to meet user standards
in the community.

6.4 Esperanza Project Financing
Understanding the system cost over time (life cycle costs) from the onset is
one the major challenges facing the rural community due to the lack of experience
with financing and technology. Initial costs depend on how the cash outlay is
structured using subsidized or non-subsidized systems. Esperanza’s subsidies ranged
from various donated time from non-profit groups or vendors, to discounted
materials and equipment yielding a total project cost for the financing loan of
$15,068USD. By distinguishing the costs associated for the PV water pumping
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system into four areas (1) the initial capital cost or cash outlay, (2) life cycle cost
(LCC), (3) cost on a per beneficiary basis, and (4) cost per volume (m 3), these can
be used as parameters to determine project feasibility and to tailor specific terms
to manage expectations and overall financial performance (Graham and Johnson,
2000).

An LCC model was developed to include the initial, operating, and
replacement costs of the PV water systems over the expected project life. Although
solar modules are expected to work for 20-30 years, a ten year life cycle was used
due to the multitude of variable factors that can affect a system’s appropriateness
for a specific community (Graham and Johnson, 2000).

The LCC analysis also assumed these additional costs in the Esperanza base
case:



A contract is given to a local solar company to maintain the
system.



An

insurance

policy

provided

by

the

NGO

covers

the

pump/controller.


A community member is paid to perform civil works repairs.



The pump and the controller are replaced after 7 years.



ADESOL charges an annual fee for on-going technical assistance
and administration.

The financial parameters used in the LCC are listed in Table 6.2.:
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Return of equity
30%
Percentage borrowed
100%
Commercial interest rate
20%
Inflation rate
12%
Year of analysis
20
Table 6.2. Financial parameters of the Life Cycle Cost (Source: Graham and
Johnson, 2000)

The initial cost of the equipment, system and project were calculated over
the twenty year life cycle. The LCC analysis is highly sensitive to the inputs so the
numbers are provided as rough estimates (Graham and Johnson, 2000).

The quality of the long-term system care of a system is only a fraction of
the initial investment made. It is important to design models for rural water supply
that have components for cost recovery and plan for long-term care of the system
given that each one is interdependent of each other. One solution is to utilize
insurance contracts to hedge against variable costs and market risks. Enersol has
an insurance policy for borrowers that allow the burden of annual costs to be
hedged with an agreed flat fee and any costs above that amount are born by the
insurer. Should the project not exceed the amount of the fees paid to the insurer, it
is not refunded to the borrower. A flexible financing model could be adapted to
monitor and manage variable costs and market risks by closely analyzing the cash
flows income to debt.

Esperanza pays a monthly insurance fee for a policy on the water pumping
system. If the system fails ADESOL is responsible for the repair or replacement
costs. This fee was included with the monthly payment of annual service fee made
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to ADESOL. ADESOL requires that communities make payments in their offices
or they will cutoff water supply when payments are not made on time (Source:
Graham and Johnson, 2000).

Esperanza’s monthly payments over a 5 year period are expected to cover
an estimated 30-50% of the initial capital investment in the PV water pumping
equipment (Source: Graham and Johnson, 2000). The willingness to pay is
impacted by the water quality delivered by the PV system. If the water is not
considered suitable for drinking or cooking, the willingness to pay will decrease
reducing the likelihood of the user fees to cover the initial capital investment.
Analysis from studies conducted on rural water supply systems indicate that over
the long term, with additional households connected to the water systems there
will be a demand and willingness to pay for the improved service (Singh, et al,
1993). Additional investments will be needed in filters and technology to bring the
water quality to acceptable standards which in turn will drive up the costs of the
overall system. These additional investments can also negatively impact the
willingness to pay and must be relayed to the end-user by in proportion to the
average household income.

6.5 Research Design
The objective of the case model is to determine whether the proposed
theoretical mathematical framework can facilitate sustainable financing strategies
to optimize usage of funds. The studied parameters and indicators used for the
cash flow analysis are detailed in Appendix E. A total of three cash flows were
compiled for the cash flow analysis. Cash flow A uses the Esperanza base case
model previously discussed in this chapter. Cash flow B simulates the Esperanza
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base case but assumes that the village pays for the real arising costs rather than
using an insurance payment. Using the assumption of 15-25% maintenance cost
over the life time of the project and the theoretical mathematical model we
demonstrate that the overall project costs are significantly lower in the OWF
model. Cash flow C presents the OWF framework to replicate a cash flow that
uses a feedback loop to manage financial disturbances in order to optimize usage of
funds for a desired rate of return and warrant sustainability of the Esperanza water
project. Cash flow C’s structure is described in greater detail in the next section.

6.6 Cash Flow C: OWF Case Model
The OWF model for Esperanza’s Case C used the underlying assumptions
and the true project data (e.g. the amount of water produced) of the base case
model, A, to incorporate a feedback loop system using a current or real-time
depiction of the LCA of the case. The financing terms were linked to the true
project cost and results of the cash income through on-going feedback loops within
the model which are continuously modified to meet the expectation of the ideal
water project among the stakeholders.

The System Dynamics (SD) process of linking conditions of system
variables, which are unknown from identified conditions of other system variables,
is adapted mathematically to describe the random nature of stakeholder interests.
SD is implemented using a performance measure, feedback loops and feedback
control.

The signals of the control system of a feedback loop structure as shown in
Figure 5.8, for OWF’s case model are defined as:
78

r = setpoint (reference: the ideal outcome of the water project)
u = revenue offset factor (variation: control variable)
y = operational cash flow (performance parameter being measured)
e = error (setpoint – operational cash flow)

The feedback control structure was first implemented by using a rule-based
system design methodology where the rules are treated as the decision variables
(Liu, Zabinsky & Kohn, 2010). The output is continually used in the forecasting of
the control system to correct the desired behavior (Liu, Zabinsky & Kohn, 2011).
The operation rules are a subset of rules determined by the managers of the system
to directly model operations using their expertise (Liu, Zabinsky & Kohn, 2010).
By having OWF behave using rule-based logic for the revenue offset factor, u, the
system can appropriately respond to the ideal water financing for the stakeholders.

The rule-based system design was then improved by replacing it with a
proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller that is a very effective method to
keeping the process variable closely within a setpoint (VanDoren, 2003). PID
controllers are generally used to control systems with linear response and can be
highly unstable for non-linear systems, like the herein discussed case. The process
variables were manually adjusted to yield the best control behavior for the
nonlinear time invariant water project. The cash flow uses a PID controller to
adjust the revenue offset factor using the following mathematical formula:

(

)
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The gain parameters are used to adjust the behavior of the PID controller
to fluctuation of the operational cash flow (OC) of the system. The errors relate to
the difference of the OC and the desired setpoint of the system. The later can be
defined by the stakeholders to achieve a particular project revenue goal. In our
case, the OC is the negative of the sum of the differences of the monthly actual
cost-assumed cost and the monthly actual cost-project income. The monthly
amount billed (MAB) is rule based to inhibit overshooting of the PID control loop
in the event of large random cost spikes. The MAB therefore first compares the
amount to be charged to the maximum amount for which the WTP is non-zero. If
the amount is larger than the WTP, only the maximum amount is charged and the
remaining cost is rolled over to the next billing cycle. This is only the case when
the project cost drastically increases, as in the case of a pump failure. If the
amount is within a range of non-zero WTP, the PID controller provides a factor by
which the MAB is multiplied. Using the feedback control loop describes above, the
PID controller adjust the MAB such that the operational cash flow is continuously
adjusted to approach the desired setpoint. Cash flow risk distribution commonly is
controlled by the timing of payments which substantiates the use of the controller
to modify the billing costs for the project (Garden and Creese, 2000).

By using the revenue offset factor to adjust the amount billed and hence the
cash income in the next billing cycle, the revenue from the user’s fees can facilitate
in the cost recovery of the project and manage the overall risk for stakeholders. As
described above the control loops considers the optimum price point the users are
willing to pay, adjusting the unfunded liability balance using forward billing until
that amount is no longer a liability. Any disturbances encountered in the cash flow
such as poor water quality and replacement costs of technology and material are
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examples of how this is factored into the billing arrangement through the revenue
offset factor.

The indicators used in PID program are:
1. Actual costs less the assumed max costs
2. Actual costs less the actual income
3. Operational cash flow measure

6.7 Cash Flow Analysis
Hypothesis: the existing cash flow analysis is adequate to determine
feasibility and financial sustainability of water projects.

Null hypothesis: proposed mathematical model using optimal feedback
control theory to maximize the performance of a water project.

In considering the structure of the hypothesis and the cash flow analysis
used for the data, the three cases were used to determine the significance of the
proposed OWF framework. The sample size consisted of the initial year to start up
the project and 19 year cash flow broken into the monthly payments for a 20 year
project (228 months). Because cash flow risk occurs when the project is
implemented, a period to period approach is best in cash flow analysis (Garden and
Creese, 2000). However, the first year was not factored into the financial pro forma
arranged between the borrower and lender it was not included in our cash flow
analysis.

81

All of the data and information needed for calculating the projected cash
flows were taken from the base case, Esperanza. Considering the structure of the
cash flow hypothesis and collected data, a one-way ANOVA, f-test was applied for
data analysis.

6.8 Results and Discussion
Results of 100 runs of the cash flows of Case A, B, and C were analyzed
using the ANOVA analysis included in the Microsoft Excel Analysis ToolPak. This
analysis provides a variety of statistical results for data analysis and hypothesis
testing.

In addition, the operational cash flow, along with its two constituents the
differences of actual cost – assumed cost (Indicator 1) and actual cost – income
(Indicator 2), is plotted for comparison.

The results for Case A and Case B are plotted in Figure 6.1 and listed in
Table 6.3. As case A relates to the initial water project, the variation seen all cash
flows is rather low. Indicator 1 shows a steady decline due to a 7% discount rate,
which in turn leads to a slow increase of the operational cash flow over the course
of the project. The total project cost for case A is $ 22,016.58, which corresponds
to about 1% revenue.

Case B is based on the assumptions used in Case A, but includes random
monthly costs that correspond to the 15-25% assumed for maintenance cost over
the life cycle. A PID controller with setpoint of 50 is used to flexibly adjust the
operational efficiency. The cash flows in Case B show an overshooting of the
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control loops in the beginning months. This is due to the non-linearity of the
system and could be mitigated by using different control gain parameters at the
beginning of the project. Since the goal of this section is to show the general
functionality of a system using a control loop, this error will not be neglected
hereafter. Despite the randomness in the cost, the cost factors in the right panel of
Figure 6.1 are fairly constant with low overall noise, considering that the deviations
are stemming for a total of 100 runs. The setpoint in Case B was set to yield a
slightly higher return rate (2%) as compared to Case A. The total cost for Case B
was calculated to $16,261.38 which is significantly less than for Case A,
$22,0618.58. The comparison shows that a water project with real-life cost factors
that are random can be successfully run when using a control loop approach,
especially due to the possibility of flexible adjustments of finance terms, as will be
demonstrated in Case C. The Case C proof aims to maximize the results of optimal
water quality, WTP, water demand, reducing overall costs, and the potential of the
ideal water project. These results help achieve the notion of “water pays for water
and only water” (Cap-Net, 2008).
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Figure 6.1. Cash flows of base case, Case A (left) and Case B(right)
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Table 6.3. Summary of Anova Analysis of Case A

Groups

Count Sum

Average Variance

Actual/assumed cost
water prod/water demand
water cost/moving average
cash income/debt service
H2O operating costs/pop served
Actual-assumed cost
actual cost - income
Operational cash flow

22800
22800
22800
22800
22800
22800
22800
22800

0.80
1.46
0.99
1.00
0.11
-25.05
0.02
25.03

18147.2
33184.8
22549.3
22797.7
2562.1
-571153.1
403.1
570750.0

0.009
0.037
0.001
0.001
0.003
141.647
7.316
150.922

ANOVA

Source of
Variation

SS

df

MS

Between Groups 28653554.63
Within Groups 6838247.29

8.00
205191.00

3581694.33 107473.66 0.00
33.33

Total

205199.00

35491801.93

F

P-value F crit
1.94

Table 6.4. Summary of Anova Analysis of Case B

Groups

Count Sum

Average Variance

Actual/assumed cost
water prod/water demand
water cost/moving average
cash income/debt service
H2O operating costs/pop. served
Actual-assumed cost
actual cost - income
Operational cash flow

22800
22800
22800
22800
22800
22800
22800
22800

13564.2
33191.9
22534.3
22629.1
440.0
-1133738.3
13196.4
1120541.9

0.59
1.46
0.99
0.99
0.02
-49.73
0.58
49.15

df

MS

0.002
0.037
0.001
0.003
0.000
30.895
22.090
62.441

ANOVA

Source of Variation SS

F

P-value F crit

Between Groups
Within Groups

111513220 8
13939153 1086458 0
2632581.26 205191 12.82991

Total

114145802

205199
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1.938459

In Case C additional disturbances are introduced that would under normal
circumstances impose tremendous challenges for a water project if not stall it. The
disturbances enter the system as higher random costs at random intervals costs
relating to investments necessary to maintain water quality. The latter costs are
modeled such the probability of them occurring is higher after specific time periods.
This can be clearly seen by the areas of high fluctuations in the cash flows depicted
in Figure 6.3. Despite the severe impact of the disturbances, the control loop is
able to balance the operational cash flow by taking into account the WTP and by
spreading the total cost over several billing cycles. The overall project cost of
$22,242.53 is comparable to the Case A, $22,016.58, while a return of 13% was
achieved.

Table 6.5. Summary of Anova Analysis of Case C

Groups

Count

Sum

Average Variance

Actual/assumed cost
water prod/water demand
water cost/moving average
cash income/debt service
H2O operating costs/pop. served
Actual-assumed cost

22800
22800
22800
22800
22800
22800

0.94
1.46
0.99
0.95
0.12
-7.51

0.412
0.038
0.001
0.211
0.065
6208.830

actual cost - income
Operational cash flow

22800
22800

21405.5
33219.1
22549.9
21650.6
2625.8
171186.6
115949.0
55237.6

5.09
2.42

5227.751
13243.603

ANOVA

Source of Variation SS

df

MS

F

P-value

F crit

Between Groups
Within Groups

2067046.65 8
258380.8 94.21962305 3.7E-157 1.938459
562700416 205191 2742.325

Total

564767463 205199
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Figure 6.2. Cash flows of Case C
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The results show that control loops are a means for flexible financing of water
projects, which can significantly improve the performance of such a system and the
sustainability of the project overall.

6.9 Future Work of Mathematical Model
To demonstrate the functionality and output of the OWF model using
optimal control, a stochastic version of the logistic model (also called VerhulstPearl model) was programmed in the programming language Matlab. The results of
this preliminary model are only hypothetical and meant as a proof of concept
rather than relating to the earlier discussed Cases A-C. Future work will focus on
this model. The Verhulst-Pearl model describes the growth of population under
the influence of limiting factors like resources. Therefore, it is similar to a water
financing project whose objective is to maximize the performance under the
influence of limiting factors. The basic logistic model is expanded to react to the
random fluctuation of inputs. Furthermore feedback control is introduced to
optimize the performance.

The logistic model was established by Verhulst to model population growth
and can be written in form of a differential equation:

(

)

(Eq. 6.1)

With M as the maximum size of the population and  as a parameter; the
term y describes the growth, while the second term y2M-1 limits the growth due
to constraints like lack of resources.
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The random nature of the input variables can be introduced by adding the
stochastic term  dW(t) which describes the random nature and leads to:

(

)

(Eq. 6.2)

Furthermore, in order to maximize the payoff function feedback control is
introduced by the control term u(t):

(

)

( ) (Eq. 6.3)

In the uncontrolled version (Eq. 6.2) the model approaches a long-term
mean value, while the value of the performance function can be influenced in the
controlled model (Eq. 6.3). The latter gives us a model that flexibly adjusts
parameters using a feedback control term to maximize expectations between
stakeholders. Over time, OWF will approach the desired outcome of stakeholders
where it is mutually beneficial. The idea of OWF is to show that the action of
control will change how the system progresses and the control design needs to come
up with the best strategy.

As mentioned in Chapter 5, the solution of stochastic differential equations
usually requires numerical techniques that approximate the solution. The model
uses the Euler-Maruyama (EM) method to solve the SDE.

The EM approximation to the true solution is the Markov chain y defined as
follows (Kloeden and Platen, 1992):
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partition the interval [0, T] into N equal subintervals of width δ > 0:




set Y0 = x0;



recursively define Yn for 1 ≤ n ≤ N by

(

)

√

, where

The above mathematical model was programmed in Matlab code. In the
following examples of various runs are discussed.

Figure 6.3 shows the uncontrolled variation of a stochastic function with time.
To show the effects of the parameters  and  on the dynamics of the model, 
was increased from top to bottom. It is clearly visible that the system approaches
the steady state faster at higher values of . The value of  was varied between 0.1
on the left and 0.5 on the right side. The parameter  can be used to describe the
magnitude of the changes that are to be modeled (compare noise level in Figure
6.3).
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Figure 6.3. Result of an uncontrolled stochastical function with increasing value of
 from top to bottom for  = 0.1 on the left and 0.5 on the right.
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The comparison between the left and right side of Figure 6.3 shows that a
larger value of  leads to a larger response of the overall system behavior. Hence,
this parameter can be used to define the magnitude of various inputs on the overall
system.

In Figure 6.4 an example of a control feedback loop is presented for the case
of a well-defined change (left) and multiple random changes (right). As described
in the previous chapters, the idea of the model is to react flexible to changes of the
input variables. On the left panel a defined change was introduced at a specific
point in time. The result shows how the system adapts to the new condition. On
the right hand side the amount of change was varied randomly (as reflected in the
varying height of the steps in the output function).
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Figure 6.4. Results of a controlled stochastic model with defined change of input
(left) and random change of input (right).

In order to apply this model to the theoretical model case, specific functions
representing each input will need to be defined. The outcome of such a refined
model will yield a financing model that can flexibly react to any changes in the
input functions.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to address the issue of sustainable access
to safe drinking water and basic sanitation provisions of water by 2015. The UNDP
estimates that currently just fewer than 900 million people lack access to safe
water, where 8 out of 10 of those persons are living in rural areas along with just
over 2.7 billion people lack access to basic sanitation (UNDP, 2011).

Water infrastructure traditionally is financed by three types of sources:
water users through a billing arrangement, tax payers and donors. Official
development assistance (ODA) has been the key source for developing countries in
leverage financial flows. The discussion of financing water policies and water
regimes is highly debated amongst all give that the challenges of financial and
technical assistance will continue to be at the forefront of the water sector debate.
In considering these challenges due to the uncertainty in sector, water financing
should be more inclusive of stakeholders expectations, such as the borrower, in
determining the cash flow of monies distributed and invested in projects for their
benefit “Involving the end user in project planning and implementation is essential
to establishing community ownership and commitment to funding long-term
maintenance which is an essential element of sustainable projects” (WASRAG,
2008, p.24).
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The main idea presented in this thesis was to provide a framework for a
mathematical model for sustainable financing mechanisms of water projects funded
by groups like non-governmental agencies (NGOs), philanthropic donors, and
investors. The objective of the model is to benefit rural and underdeveloped
communities to focus on borrower-lending financing strategies to optimize the
usage of funds.

The financial markets rely on investment science whereby applying scientific
tools to investments in qualitative analysis, such as the character of those involved,
and quantitative analysis which uses mathematics, finance, statistics, and computer
science modeling. With the increase of investment science in the financial markets,
they have by and large overlooked the importance of effective control mechanisms
that fundamental to dynamic systems dependent on feedback loops to stabilize
expected market changes (McMahon, 2011). It can be said that borrowers do not
always make sensible or logical decisions as studied in behavioral economics
arguing the conventional wisdom views of borrowers acting rationally and acting
out in their benefit (Shicks and Rosenberg, 2011). We are all viewing the cash flow
investment from our own individual perspective which is not necessarily aligned
with all of the stakeholders.

Cash flow analyses are metrics that have circular references like feedback
loops that will always be unstable regardless of market stability or declines. This
amplification of the feedback loop occurs over periods of time that can either be
days, weeks, months, quarters, or years resulting in disconnects between borrowers
and lenders of financial models. As observed by McMahon of the scientific concepts
failed to be integrated in finance and economics, “we have incorporated the
mathematical concept of equilibrium in our metrics, but we neglected to realize the
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importance of other scientific phenomena, such as momentum, amplification,
feedback loops, control theory, and the uncertainty principle. We have relied on
our metric outputs as if efficient markets do not need stabilizers and behavioral
finance phenomena are inconsequential and strategic opportunities for wise
investors. Economic and financial models assume investors are rational and will
pursue utility maximization, but behavioral factor often alter expected outcomes,
sometimes to a severe degree” (p. 54).

7.1 Results
With the theoretical mathematical model given with our initial results
reaffirms the need to integrate control mechanism in dynamic systems dependent
on feedback loops, to manage the fluctuating markets between borrowers and
lenders. Applying investment science to water financing is a logical means of
providing guidance of how things are in the present, to the potential possibility of
how things should be within the dialogue of stakeholders. Ultimately, the
framework gives what people want with water; “water pays for water and only
water” (Cap-Net, 2008).

7.3 Future Work
The framework presented in thesis focuses on a development for sustainable
water financing mathematical model for borrowers and lenders. The theoretical
framework aids in the discussion of how can financing can really become innovative
financing through a stochastic dynamic programming (SDP). SDP is an
optimization approach taking into account the uncertainties of the system dynamic
model of water financing. In the future we hope to expand this theoretical
framework to include water projects financed using this mathematical model and
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systems dynamic approach of qualitative and quantitative properties to further the
movement of innovative financing between borrowers and lenders. Additionally, we
hope to apply the results of the framework to other investment sectors of
borrowing and lending.
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APPENDIX A: IBNET INDICATORS
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IBNET Indicator Definitions
SERVICE INDICATOR
1.1 Water Coverage

UNIT
%

DEFINITION
Population with access to water
services (either with direct service
connection or within reach of a
public water point) as a percentage
of the /total population under
utility’s nominal responsibility

1.2 Water Coverage –
Household Connections
1.3 Water Coverage –
Public Water Points

%

Sub-set of 1.1

%

Sub-set of 1.1

2.1 Sewerage Coverage

%

Population with sewerage services
(direct service connection)as a
percentage of the total population
under utility’s notional responsibility

Notes
Coverage is a key development indicator. All coverage indicators are impacted
by whether the data on population and household size is up to date and accurate.
The need to estimate the population served by public water points and/or the
number of households per connection may affect the confidence that can be
placed in the water coverage measure.
Utilities are encouraged to provide a description what implicit assumptions are
underlying their water and sewerage coverage estimates, including the number of
people using public water points and household connections.
WATER CONSUMPTION
UNIT
DEFINITION
AND PRODUCTION
INDICATOR
3.1 Water Production
litres/person/
Total annual water supplied
3.2 Water Production
day
to the distribution system
m3/conn
(including purchased water,
/month
if any) expressed by
 population served
per day and
 connection per
month.
4.1 Total Water Consumption litres/person/
Total annual water sold
4.2 Total Water Consumption day
expressed by population
m3/conn
served by
/month
 Population served
per day
 connection per
month
Water consumption split by
customer type:
%
Shows the split of total
4.3 Residential Consumption
water consumption into four
4.4 Industrial / commercial
customer type categories
Consumption
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4.5 Consumption by
Institutions & others
4.6 Bulk treated supply
Residential consumption:
litres/person/
Shows the average water
4.7 Residential Consumption
day
consumption per person per
day by customer category
4.8 Residential Consumption –
connections to mains supply
4.9 Residential consumption public water points
Notes
The preferred water consumption indicator is expressed in terms of
litres/person/day. However there are data issues with the use of this indicator,
namely


lack of accurate total consumption data (especially when metering is not
universal)



lack of up-to-date census data, or other relevant survey data, to determine (i)
household size; (ii) sharing of connections between households; and (iii)
number of households using public water points
Inter utility comparisons will be more difficult, however, given the different mix
of household sizes and dwellings served by one connection. This is especially the
case between utilities in different countries, but it is not necessarily the case that
household size, and dwellings per connection, or use of public water points are
more similar within a country.
The accuracy of service populations may need improvement, but will not be
directly available from utilities unless the utilities undertake analysis to
understand their consumer profiles.
NON-REVENUE
UNIT
DEFINITION
INDICATOR
6.1 Non-Revenue Water
%
Difference between water supplied
and water sold (i.e. volume of water
“lost”) expressed as a percentage of
6.2 Non-Revenue Water
m3/km/day net water supplied
Volume of water “lost” per km of
6.3 Non-Revenue Water
m3/conn/da water distribution network per day
y
Volume of water “lost” per water
connection per day.
Notes
Non-revenue water represents water that has been produced and is “lost” before it
reaches the customer (either through leaks, through theft, or through legal usage
for which no payment is made). Part of this “lost” water can be retrieved by
appropriate technical and managerial actions. It can then be used to meet
currently unsatisfied demand (and hence increase revenues to the utility), or to
defer future capital expenditures to provide additional supply (and hence reduce
costs to the utility).
The IWA distinguish between non-revenue water (%) and unaccounted for water,
with the latter not including legal usage that is not paid for. The indicators are
usually measured in m3/conn/day. The difference is usually small, and the
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IBNET Toolkit therefore only uses non-revenue water as an indicator.
There is a debate as to the most appropriate measure of non-revenue water. A
percentage approach can make utilities with high levels of consumption, or
compact networks, look to be better performing than those with low levels of
consumption or extensive networks. To capture these different perspectives the
reporting of three measures of non-revenue water has become the norm.
METERING PRACTICES UNIT
INDICATOR
7.1 Metering level
%
8.1 % sold that is metered

DEFINITION
Total number of connections with
operating meter/ total number of
connections, expressed in percentage
Volume of water sold that is
metered/ Total volume of water
sold, expressed in percentage

%

Notes
Metering of customers is considered good practice. It allows customers the
opportunity to influence their water bills, and provides utilities with tools and
information to allow them to better manage their systems.
The indicators provide two separate perspectives on the issue, both of which are
relevant in their own right. Taken together the indicators provide insights into
the effectiveness of a metering installation strategy (the ratio of indicator (8)/(7)
indicates the extent to which a utility is targeting large water users as the
highest priority).
PIPED NETWORK
INDICATOR
9.1 Pipe Breaks

UNIT

DEFINITION

breaks/km/yr.

Total number of pipe breaks per
year expressed per km of the water
distribution network
Total number of blockages per year
expressed per km of sewers

10.1 Sewer System
blockages/km/
Blockages
yr.
Notes
The number of pipe breaks, relative to the scale of the system, is a measure of
the ability of the pipe network to provide a service to customers.
The rate of water pipe breaks can also be seen as a surrogate for the general state
of the network, although it reflects operation and maintenance practices too. It
must be recognized, however, that highly aggregated reporting can hide the fact
that sections of the network may be perpetually failing, whilst much of the
remainder is in reasonable condition. Break rates for different materials,
diameters or time periods laid can show where breaks are concentrated.
Sewer blockages are, likewise, a measure of the ability of the sewer network to
provide a service to customers. Blockages can reflect a number of issues
including the effectiveness of routine operations and maintenance activities, the
hydraulic performance of the network, and the general condition of the pipes.
Bursts include failures on mains, service pipes where they are the Utility’s
responsibility, or at joints or fittings that are found by visible signs of water, not
through leak detection by Utility staff. Sewer blockages include all blockages or
collapses that occur in sewers or drains that are the Utility’s responsibility,
whatever action is needed to clear them.
COSTS AND STAFFING UNIT

DEFINITION
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INDICATOR
11.1 Unit Operational Cost
Water and Wastewater
(W&WW)
11.2 Unit Operational Cost
Water and Wastewater
11.3 Unit Operational Cost
– Water only
11.4 Operational Cost
Split - % Water
11.5 Operational Cost
Split - % Wastewater
11.6 Unit Operational Cost
– Wastewater
12.2 Staff W&WW/’000
water and wastewater
connections

12.1 Staff Water /’000
Water connections

US$/m3 sold
US$/m3
produced
US$/m3 sold
%

Split of the total cost into water and
wastewater

%
US$/WW
pop served
#/’000
W&WW
conn
#/’000
W
conn
#/’000 WW
conn

12.2 Staff Wastewater/’000
Wastewater connections
12.4 Staff W&WW/’000
#/’000
W&WW pop served
W&WW pop
served
12.3 Staff Water/’000
#/’000
W
Water pop served
pop served
12.6 Staff Wastewater/’000 #/’000 WW
Wastewater pop served
pop served
12.7 Staff % Water
%
12.8 Staff % Wastewater
13.1 Labor Costs vs.
%
Operational Costs
13.2 Electrical Energy
Costs as percentage of
Operational Costs
14.1 Contracted-out
service costs as percentage
of operational costs

Total
annual
operational
expenses1/Total annual volume sold.
Total
annual
operational
expenses1/Total
annual
water
produced.
Annual water service operational
expenses1/Total annual volume sold.

%
%

Annual
wastewater
operational
expenses1/ Population served
Total number of staff expressed as
per thousand connections

Total number of staff expressed as
per thousand people served

Total annual labor costs (including
benefits) expressed as a percentage
of total annual operational costs.
Annual electrical energy costs
expressed as a percentage of total
annual operational costs.
Total cost of services contracted-out
to the private sector expressed as a
percentage of total annual
operational1 costs.

Notes
Note 1: Annual operating expenses exclude depreciation, interest and debt service
Unit operational costs provide a “bottom line” assessment of the mix of resources
used to achieve the outputs required. The preferred denominator related to
operational costs is the amount of water sold. This ratio then reflects the cost of
providing water at the customer take off point.
Lack of universal metering, lack of accurate household meters, and a focus in the
past on water production mean that an alternative measure of operational cost
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per cubic meter of water produced is also relevant in the short term.
Staff costs are traditionally a major component of operating costs.
Understanding staffing levels can often give a quick guide to the extent of any
over-manning in a water utility. While it is preferable to be able to allocate staff
time to either water or wastewater services, this information is sometimes not
available. Comparisons are best made between utilities which offer the same
scope of service both in terms of total size, and mix of water and sewer service.
Note that where outside contractors are used (see indicator 14.1), staff number
comparisons should take this into account.
The number of people served per connection varies from country to country, and
from utility to utility, depending on the housing stock and different approaches
to service connections. To facilitate international comparisons a denominator of
population served has also been included.
The relative importance of staff costs compared to total costs is captured in
indicator 13.1. Utilities are often over staffed and this measure provides insights
into the impact of possible changes in future staff numbers. Indicator 14.1
quantifies the degree to which outside (private) contractors are used to provide
the utility service.
QUALITY OF SERVICE UNIT
INDICATOR
15.1 Continuity of Service Hrs/day
15.2 Customers with
discontinuous supply

%

15.3 Quality of water
supplied: nr of tests for
residual chlorine

%
of
required

15.4 Quality of water %
supplied: samples passing
on residual chlorine
16.1 Complaints about
%
W&WW services
W&WW
conn
17.1 Wastewater – at least
primary treatment

%

17.2 Wastewater primary
treatment only

%

DEFINITION
Average hours of service per day for
water supply.
The percentage of customers with a
water supply that is discontinuous
during normal operation.
# The number of tests carried out on
samples taken from the distribution
system, as a % of the number
required by the standard that
applies. This may exceed 100%.
NB: Operational samples, or any
others that were not taken to check
compliance with the standard, are
excluded.
The percentage of samples tested for
residual chlorine that pass the
relevant standard
of Total
number
of
W&WW
complaints per year expressed as a
percentage of the total number of
W&WW connections
Proportion of collected sewage that
receives at least primary treatment,
i.e. involving settlement with the
intention of removing solids, but not
biological treatment. Both lagoon
and mechanical treatment can be
included, where appropriate.
Proportion of collected sewage that
receives primary treatment only, i.e.
involving settlement with the
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17.3 Wastewater
secondary treatment or
better

intention of removing solids, but not
biological treatment. Both lagoon
and mechanical treatment can be
included, where appropriate.
Proportion of collected sewage that
receives
at
least
secondary
treatment, i.e. removing oxygen
demand as well as solids, normally
biological.
Both
lagoon
and
mechanical
treatment
can
be
included, where appropriate.

%

Notes
Historically there has been limited attention paid to measures that capture the
quality of service provided to customers. This, in fact, should be a particular
focus of performance measurement.
The measures presented above are a limited first step in the process of capturing
information on quality of service. Complaints, while relatively easy to track, give
only a glimpse of actual company performance - consumers may have become
accustomed to poor service and not complain. In other instances it may be
difficult for customers to report complaints. Capturing at least some customer
derived data, however, is considered to be an important starting point.
Collection of wastewater does not mean that the waste is fully treated before
discharge back to the environment. The wastewater treatment indicators will
provide an understanding of the amount of effluent that is treated before being
discharged.
A more comprehensive set of quality of service indicators could be developed but
the likelihood of the data being collected by utility managers is limited in the
short term. Expansion of the set is therefore a medium to long term objective.
BILLING AND
COLLECTIONS
INDICATOR
18.1 Average Revenue
W&WW
18.2 Average Revenue
W&WW
18.3 Average Revenue –
water only
18.4 Revenue Split - %
water
18.5 Revenue Split - %
wastewater
18.6 Water revenue –
residential
18.7 Water revenue –
industrial/commercial
18.8 Water revenue –
institutions & others
18.9 Water revenue – bulk
treated supply

UNIT

DEFINITION

US$/m3
water sold
US$/W
conn./yr.
US$/m3
water sold.

Total annual W&WW operating
revenues expressed by annual
amount of water sold and by the
number of connections.
Operating revenues (W only)
expressed by annual amount of
water sold.
% of total Percentage split of total revenue into
for W&WW water and wastewater
% of total Percentage split of water revenue by
water
customer type
revenue
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18.10 Wastewater revenue
per person served
20.2 Residential fixed
component of tariff

US$/person
served

Operating revenues (WW only)
expressed per person served
Any fixed component of the
% of average residential tariff as a proportion of
20.5 Residential fixed
bill
the average tariff per connection per
year.
component of tariff - water
Water & wastewater together, and
20.6 Residential fixed
separated if possible.
component of tariff wastewater
21.1 Ratio of industrial to ratio
The average charge (per m3) to
residential tariff
industrial
customers
compared
21.2 Ratio of industrial to
against the average charge (per m3)
residential tariff - water
to residential customers.
21.3 Ratio of industrial to
Water & wastewater together, and
residential tariff separated if possible.
wastewater
23.1 Collection Period
Days
(Year-end accounts receivable/Total
annual operating revenues) * 365
23.2 Collection ratio
%
Cash income / Billed revenue as a %
Note 1. W = water service, WW = wastewater / sewerage service
Notes
Billing customers and getting paid are two different things. The effectiveness of
the collections process is measured by the amount of outstanding revenues at
year end compared to the total billed revenue for the year, in day equivalents,
and by the total amount collected as a percentage of the billed amount.
FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE
INDICATOR
24.1
Operating
Coverage

UNIT

DEFINITION

Cost ratio

Total
annual
operational
revenues/Total annual operating
costs
Cash income / Debt service * 100

25.1 Debt Service Ratio
%
Notes
These two indicators have been selected from a much larger range of financial
indicators (which include leverage, liquidity, profitability and efficiency ratios).
They help answer two important questions: (i) Do revenues exceed operating
costs? and (ii) Does the utility’s income enable it to service its debts?
ASSETS INDICATOR
27.1 Gross Fixed Assets –
water & wastewater
27.2 Gross Fixed Assets water
27.3 Gross Fixed Assets –
wastewater
Note: Gross fixed assets are
Notes

UNIT
DEFINITION
US$/W&W
Total gross fixed W&WW assets per
Wpop served W&WW populations served.
US$/W pop Total gross fixed assets per
served
population served, separately for
US$/WW
water (W) and wastewater (WW).
pop served
defined to include work in progress.

The capital intensity of the utility is indicated by the gross fixed asset value per
capita served. Unfortunately there is often limited information available about
asset values and until more emphasis is placed on this item the values derived
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must be treated with caution.
No investment indicators are included as they tend to differ widely from one year
to another due to the lumpiness of the investments. At a more detailed level,
comparisons of unit costs for particular items of equipment can be very useful;
but this is beyond the scope of IBNET.
AFFORDABILITY OF
UNIT
DEFINITION
SERVICES INDICATOR
19.1 Total revenues per % GNI per Total annual operating revenues per
service pop/GNI
capita
population served/National GNI per
capita; expressed in percentage
19.2 Monthly water bill for US$/year
Cost in local currency to a household
a household consuming
per month of 6m3 water / Exchange
6m3 of water per month
rate with US$ * 12
through a household or
shared yard tap (but
excluding the use of
standposts)?
20.1 Residential fixed
Any fixed component of the
component of tariff
US$/conn./
residential tariff (total amount).
20.3 Residential fixed
yr.
Water & wastewater together, and
component of tariff - water
separated if possible.
20.4 Residential fixed
component of tariff wastewater
20.2 Residential fixed
Any fixed component of the
component of tariff
% of average residential tariff as a proportion of
20.5 Residential fixed
bill
the average tariff per connection per
year.
component of tariff - water
Water & wastewater together, and
20.6 Residential fixed
separated if possible.
component of tariff wastewater
Notes
Average tariffs need to be put in the perspective of affordability. Household
income data, however, is not easy to obtain. The indicator selected here,
therefore, compares average per capita tariffs as a proportion of per capita GNI.
The GNI (Atlas method based) will be for the whole country, and not reflect
local variations, but is the most appropriate consistent measure currently
available for most countries. In case specific household data is available, this data
could be commented upon separately.
Some utilities use fixed charge components within the residential tariff (i.e.
irrespective of the amount of water consumed). Such tariffs can adversely affect
low volume water consumers. They also protect the revenue stream to the utility
in periods when consumption is highly variable. Comparison of the fixed
component with the average tariff will give an indication of the relative weight of
the fixed and variable component of a water bill.
There may be a cross subsidy between industrial consumers and residential
consumers. The ratio of the average charges (per m3) to industrial and
residential customers provides some quantification of this subsidy. Subsidies are
complex and this ratio provides only a simplistic assessment of the situation in
any utility.
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For many, the cost of connecting to the piped network can be a significant
financial hurdle. Comparing connection charges will provide insights into the
level to which this hurdle has been raised. It is a particular issue when seeking
to connect poorer sections of the community. The indicator provides the absolute
level and as a proportion of national GNI per capita.
PROCESS INDICATOR
CATEGORIES
P.1 What best describes the utility’s planning A. Setting budgets for next
year
process?
B. A multi-year plan that
identifies targets and
resources for change and
improvement
C. Neither of the above
(Describe....)
The management of your utility undertakes the
following:
HR.1 Has a skills and training strategy for all Yes / No
staff?
HR.2 Has an annual appraisal and target setting Yes / No
system for managers?
HR.3 Has an annual appraisal and target setting Yes / No
system for all staff?
HR.4 Has a reward and recognition program for Yes / No
all staff?
HR.5 Has the ability to recruit and dismiss staff Yes / No
(within an agreed plan)?
R.1 Who has general oversight of the utility’s A. Local, regional or
national government
services and prices?
department
B. Independent board of
stakeholders
C. Independent service &
price regulator
D. Other (Describe....)
What are the main sources of finance for
investment?
Yes / No
F.1 Grants or Government transfers to the
Yes / No
utility?
F.2 Borrowing from International Financial
Yes / No
Agencies (multi or bi laterals)?
Yes / No
F.3 Government owned banks?
F.4 Commercial banks or bond holders?
C.1 Does the utility offer more than one level of Yes / No / Not applicable
service for household or shared water supplies?1
C.2 Does the utility offer more than one level of Yes / No / Not applicable
sanitation or sewerage service/ technology for
households?2
C.3 Does the utility offer a flexible / amortized Yes / No / Not applicable
repayment option to spread the costs of
connection to the water and/or sanitation
network?
C.4 – See 19.2
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How does the utility find out the views of its
customers?
C.5.1 Letters, telephone calls etc from customers
C.5.2 Inviting customers’ views through radio,
TV or other publicity
C.5.3 Questionnaire survey
C.5.4 Other

Yes / No
Yes / No
Yes / No
Yes / No (Describe...)

Context information
Density of water connections
#/km
Density of sewer connections
#/km
The context factors are distinct from process indicators in that they are, in the
short to medium term, beyond the influence of the utility.
Information on the services provided is essential to interpreting the indicator
values. The size of the Utility is also relevant, as large utilities can benefit from
economies of scale.
The connection density indicates whether the area served by the utility is dense
and urban, or more dispersed. In areas where many households are not yet
connected, it helps to assess the likely costs and benefits of extending the
network.
Note 1. Excluding free standpipes
Note 2. Excluding free public toilets
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APPENDIX B
MATLAB CODE

Uncontrolled Scenario
tBegin=0;
tEnd=100;
dt=.01;
t=tBegin:dt:tEnd;
N=length(t);
IC=1;
mu=0.1;
sigma=0.5;
y=zeros(N,1);
y(1)=IC;
for i=2:length(y)
y(i)=y(i-1)+dt*(mu*y(i-1)*(10-y(i-1)))+sigma*sqrt(dt)*randn;
end
plot(t,y)
ylabel('state of the system')
xlabel('time')
title("mu=0.05, sigma=0.5")
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APPENDIX C
MATLAB CODE

Controlled Version with Defined Changes
tEnd=1000;
dt=.01;
t=tBegin:dt:tEnd;
N=length(t);
IC=1;
mu=0.005;
sigma=0.1;
b=1;
u=0;
du = 1;
cnt=0;
y=zeros(N,1);
y(1)=IC;
for i=2:length(y)
if cnt == 50000
u = u + du;
cnt = 0;
else
cnt = cnt +1;
endif
y(i)=y(i-1)+dt*(mu*y(i-1)*(10-y(i-1)))+dt*b*u+sigma*sqrt(dt)*randn;
end
plot(t,y)
ylabel('state of the system')
xlabel('time')
title("Control with defined change")
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APPENDIX D
MATLAB CODE

Controlled Version with Random Changes
tEnd=1000;
dt=.01;
t=tBegin:dt:tEnd;
N=length(t);
IC=1;
mu=0.005;
sigma=0.1;
b=1;
u=0;
du = u+du;
cnt=0;
y=zeros(N,1);
y(1)=IC;
for i=2:length(y)
if cnt == 20000
u = abs(randn);
cnt = 0;
else
cnt = cnt +1;
endif
y(i)=y(i-1)+dt*(mu*y(i-1)*(10-y(i-1)))+dt*b*u+sigma*sqrt(dt)*randn;
end
plot(t,y)
ylabel('state of the system')
xlabel('time')
title("Control with random change")
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APPENDIX E
Cash Flow Parameter
Costs
Present Value
Total PV
Population
Water Pumped
Water produced per month
Assumed cost per m3
Actual cost per m3 and month
Investment per person
Total Investment
Volume of water production/per
person and day in m3
Cost of volume of water produced
per day
Daily water demand per person
(m3)
Monthly water demand in m3
Water cost
Moving average
Cost of daily water demand
Cost of daily water demand
Assumed max cost
Assumed max cost per day and
person
Actual cost
Project balance
Actual cost per day and person
Months left in project
Amount billed
Unfunded liability forward billing
Billed cost per day per person
Assumed cash income
Net income
Unfunded liability
Debt Service Ratio (percent)
Project Financing loss /gain
amount
Project financing loss/gain in
percent

Definition/Assumptions
Variable costs, range from 20-40%, based on
financing arrangement with vendor and community
Real discount rate of 7.1%
Cumulative total of present value
The initial population is 237 with a 2% annual
growth rate
Cumulative total of water pumped in m3
Water pumped per month in m3
Assumed maximum cost per m3
Actual monthly cost / water pumped in that month
Total present value cost per person
Investment per person * population (same as Total
PV)
Water produced/population
Water produced per month * water cost
Random value between 15 and 20 Liter.
Daily water demand * days per month * population
Total PV/water pumped (cumulative)
The average cost of water from the initial month to
the current month
Water cost * daily demand of water per person
Water cost * daily demand of water per
person*population
Maximum cost taken from initial model case
Maximum cost/days per month*population
Monthly amortization of initial project cost +
monthly costs+ previous unfunded liability +
present value for the time period
Cumulative Assumed cash income – present value
Actual cost/population*days per month
The time period remaining in the cash flow
Rule based decision based on project costs (see
detailed discussion in 6.6.
Cumulative difference of cash income and actual
cost if billed amount was not met.
Amount billed/population*days per month
Amount billed * Willingness to Pay
Assumed cash income – actual costs
Present value of amount billed – assumed cash
income
Assumed cash income/actual cost
Sum of assumed cash income – Sum of total
present cost
project financing loss/gain amount*100/sum of total
present value
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Revenue offset factor
Percentage of passing water
standards
Additional investment – Water
quality
Average household income
Billed cost/income
Annual water operating
costs/population served

(
)
Stochastic modeling of water quality degradation
with time
The additional investment amount needed in a year
if the water quality standard falls below 87%
The average household income per month and
person
Billed cost per day per person/average household
income per day
Present Value/population
Ranges stepwise from 0 to 100% depending on the
fraction of billed cost/income and fluctuates
randomly:

Willingness to Pay (WTP)

Disturbance
Actual - assumed cost
Actual cost - income
Operational cash flow measure
Setpoint
Error
Accumulated error
K
Ti
Td

Billed cost over income
Willingness to pay
[0..0.01[
100-95%
[0.01….03[
100-85%
[0.03..0.05[
95-70%
[0.05..0.07[
80-65%
[0.07..
0%
Models random project cost between 0 to 55 USD
per month for most month and 0 to 300 USD for a
minor random fraction over the course of the project
Actual cost – assumed cost
Actual cost – assumed cash income
Performance measure as described in Chapter 6.6
Reference setpoint (ideal water project)
Setpoint – operational cash flow
Current error + previous error balance
Proportional gain that causes a change to the
output proportional to the current error value
Integral term is the sum of the direct error over
time giving the accumulated offset that should have
been corrected earlier
Derivative gain that considers the rate of change of
the error

113

REFERENCES

Agarwal, A., Narain, S., Khurana, I., & Centre for Science and Environment (New
Delhi,India). (2001). Making Water Everybody's Business: Practice and policy
of Water Harvesting. New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment.
Akkermans, H. A., and van Oorschot, K. E. (2005). Relevance assumed: A case
study of balanced scorecard development using system dynamics. The Journal

of the Operational Research Society, 56(8), 931-941.
doi:10.1057/palgrave.jors.2601923
Aswathanarayana, U. (2001). Water Resources Management and the Environment.
Lisse: Balkema.
Baletti A and Raymond P (2005). Financing Water Supply and Sanitation
Investments: Utilizing Risk Mitigation Instruments to Bridge the Financing
Gap. The World Bank, Washington DC.
Bianchi, C., & Montemaggiore, G. B. (2008). Enhancing Strategy Design and
Planning in Public Utilities Through Dynamic Balanced Scorecards: Insights
from a Project in a City Water Company. System Dynamics Review, 24(2),
175-213. doi:10.1002/sdr.395
Breslin, E. D. (2010). Rethinking hydrophilanthropy: Smart Money for
Transformative Impact. Journal of Contemporary Water Research &
Education, 145(1), 65-73. doi:10.1111/j.1936-704X.2010.00084.x
Brooks, D. B., & International Development Research Centre. (2002). Water:

Local-level Management. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.

114

Brugha, R., Donoghue, M., Starling, M., Ndubani, P., Ssengooba, F., Fernandes,
B., & Walt, G. (2004). The Global Fund: Managing Great Expectations. The

Lancet, 364(9428), 95-100. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(04)16595-1
Cap-Net, GWP, & EUWI. (2008). Economics in Sustainable Water Management
Training Manual. Retrieved from
http://www.gwptoolbox.org/index2.php?option=com_reference&reference_id=1
49&pop=1
Cardone, R.; Fonseca, C. (2006). Experiences with Innovative Financing - Small
Town Water Supply and Sanitation Service Delivery. UN-HABITAT.
http://www.washdoc.info/docsearch/title/155938
Chaurey, A., Sadaphal, P. M., & Tyaqi, D. (1993). Experiences with SPV Water
Pumping Systems for Rural Applications in India. Renewable Energy, 3(8),
961-964. doi:10.1016/0960-1481(93)90058-O
Clermont, F. (2006). Official Development Assistance for water from 1990 to 2004.
Paris: World Water Council & World Water Forum. Retrieved from
http://www.world watercouncil.org/file
admin/wwc/Library/Publications_and_reports/Full Text_Cover_ODA.pdf
Cloutier, M., & Rowley, P. (2011). The Feasibility of Renewable Energy Sources
for Pumping Clean Water in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study for Central
Nigeria. Renewable Energy, 36(8), 2220-2226. doi:10.1016/j.renene.2010.12.019
Cosgrove, W. J., Rijsberman, F. R., & World Water Council. (2000). World Water
Vision: Making Water Everybody's Business. London: Earthscan.

115

COWI: Developing Financing Strategies in Water Supply and Sanitation. Note
produced for the EUWI Finance Working Group, July 2007. Retrieved from
http://www.euwi.net/files/euwi/8509_tmpphpJ2Jwqv.pdf
DANCEE, OECD EAP Task Force. (2004). The FEASIBLE Model, Version 2:
User Manual and Documentation. Retrieved from
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/62/36229036.pdf
Davies, P. (2011). The Role of the Private Sector in the Context of Aid
Effectiveness. Final Report, 2 February 2011. Retrieved from
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/58/47088121.pdf
Evans, L. (2011). An Introduction to Stochastic Differential Equations Version 1.2.
University of California, Berkley.
Fauske, K. (2006). Example: Control System Principals. Retrieved from
http://www.texample.net/tikz/examples/control-system-principles/
Fonseca, C.; Dubé, A.; Verhoeven, J. (2011). Cost-based decision support tools for
water and sanitation. (WASHCost working paper; no. 4). The Hague, The
Neterlands, IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre. Retrieved from
http://www.washcost.info/media/files/working_paper_4_cost_based_decision_sup
port_tools.
Forrester, J. W. (2007). System dynamics – a personal view of the first fifty years.
System Dynamics Review, 23(2-3), 345-358. doi:10.1002/sdr.382
Frerot, A. (2011). Water :Towards a culture of responsibility [L'eau, pour une
culture de la responsabilit.English] (1 English-language ed.). Durham, N.H.:
University of New Hampshire Press.
116

Garden II, G., and Creese, R. (2000). Cash flow analysis in construction projects.

AACE International Transactions. RI2A.
Gary, M., Kunc, M., Morecroft, J., & Rockart, S. (2009). System dynamics and
Strategy. System Dynamics Review, 24(4), 407.
Graham, S. and Johnson, E. (2000). A Case Study and an Emerging Model:
Renewable Energy for Rural Community Water Supply in the Dominican
Republic. Enersol Associates, Inc. Retrieved from
http://www.enersol.org/programs/docs/AGUASOL-DR-Case_Study_Water.pdf
GTZ ( Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH). 2006.
Financing the Water and Wastewater Sector: Financial Instruments to Meet
Water Sector Challenges. Retrieved from
http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-water-financial-instruments.pdf
Hamdy, A. (2002). Towards sustainable water resource use and management: new
responsibilities of public, private and NGO's sectors. CIHEAM/Mediterranean
Agronomic Institute of Bari. Retrieved from
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=towards%20sustainable%20water
%20resource%20use%20and%20management%3A%20new%20responsibilities%2
0of%20public%2C%20private%20and%20ngo%27s%20sectors%20atef%20hamd
y&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCYQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fweb.idrc.ca
%2Fuploads%2FuserS%2F10638196821PPP_and_Sustainable_Reuse_CIHEAM.doc&ei=oyTcTrKWLe
jTiALMlrVu&usg=AFQjCNGwRAYGVJ7IfYVeB8WHZKgGuPcnUw&cad=rj
a

117

International Benchmarking Network (IBNET). (2011). Water and Sanitation
Utilities Toolkit. Retrieved from http://www.ibnet.org/en/texts.php?folder_id=100&L=1&S=2
Jansky, L., & Uitto, J. I. (2005). Enhancing participation and governance in water

resources management: Conventional approaches and information technology .
Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press.
Ketkar, S., and Ratha, D. (2008). Innovative financing for development World
Bank.
Kirk, D. E. (1970). Optimal Control Theory; an Introduction. Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Kloeden, P. E., & Platen, E. (1992). Numerical solution of stochastic differential
equations Springer-Verlag.
Liu, H., Zabinsky, Z. B., & Kohn, W. (2010). Rule-based control system design for
smart grids. Paper presented at the Power and Energy Society General

Meeting, 2010 IEEE, 1-5.
Liu, H., Zabinsky, Z. B., & Kohn, W. (2011). Rule-based forecasting and
production control system design utilizing a feedback control architecture. IIE

Transactions, 43(2), 143.
Luo, B., Maqsood, I., & Huang, G. H. (2007). Planning water resources systems
with interval stochastic dynamic programming. Water Resources Management,

21(6), 997-1014. doi:10.1007/s11269-006-9069-4

118

Meah, K., Fletcher, S., & Ula, S. (2008). Solar Photovoltaic Water Pumping for
Remote Locations. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 12(2), 472-487.
doi:10.1016/j.rser.2006.10.008
McMahon, G. (2011). Mark-to-market's real role in the crisis: How accounting
standards helped build the ‘super bubble'.(markets & investments). The CPA

Journal, 81(2), 46.
M, J. (2000). A Model for Small-scale Photovoltaic Solar Water Pumping.
Renewable Energy, 19(1-2), 85-90. doi:10.1016/S0960-1481(99)00020-8
Moss J., Wolff G., Gladden G., Gutieriez E. (2003). Valuing Water for Better
Governance. How to promote dialogue to balance social, environmental and
economic values?. CEO Panel, Business and Industry. Retrieved from
http://www.pacinst.org/reports/valuing_water/valuing_water_paper.pdf
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), & WWC
(World Water Council). (2008). Creditor Reporting System: Aid Activities in
Support of Water Supply and Sanitation 2001-2006. Paris: OECD.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). (2009).
Managing Water for All: An OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing.
Paris: OECD.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development). (2010a).
Financing Water and Sanitation in Developing Countries: The Contribution of
External Aid, June 2010
OECD-DAC (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentDevelopment Assistance Committee). 2011. The Role of the Private Sector in
119

the Context of Aid Effectiveness Supporting more effective partnership for
development in Busan. OECD, Paris, France.
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/35/48156055.pdf
Payen, G. (2006). Water Business. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development. The OECD Observer, (254), 24.
Rees J.A., J. Winpenny, A.W. Hall (2008), Water Financing and Governance, TEC
Background papers, no. 12, Global Water Partnership. Retrieved from
http://www.gwpforum.org.
Regional Workshop on Local Water Harvesting for Mountain Households in the
Hindu Kush-Himalayas, Banskota, M., Chalise, S. R., & International Centre
for Integrated Mountain Development. (2000). Waters of life : Perspectives of
water harvesting in the hindu kush-himalayas : Proceedings of the regional
workshop on local water harvesting for mountain households in the hindu-kush
himalayas, kathmandu, march 14-16, 1999.
Rehan, R., Knight, M. A., Haas, C. T., & Unger, A. J. A. (2011). Application of
System Dynamics for Developing Financially Self-sustaining Management
Policies for Water and Wastewater Systems. Water Research, 45(16), 47374750. doi:10.1016/j.watres.2011.06.001
Roddick, A. (2004). Troubled water :Saints, sinners, truth and lies about the global

water crisis. Chichester: Anita Roddick Books.
Roy, M. (2011). Global Water Governance. Retrieved from
http://www.iisd.org/generata/?page_id=2009

120

Saleth, R. M., Dinar, A., & World Bank. (2004). The Institutional Economics of

Water: A Cross-Country Analysis of Institutions and Performance.
Cheltenham, UK; Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Sandor, E., Scott, S., Benn, J. (2009) Innovative Financing to Fund Development:
Progress and Prospects. Paris. OECD.
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/47/44087344.pdf
Segerfeldt, F., & ebrary, I. (2005). Water for sale [Vatten till salu.English].
Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute. Retrieved from
http://www.library.unlv.edu/help/remote.html; http://
site.ebrary.com/lib/unlv/Doc?id=10379685
Schicks, J., Rosenberg, R. 2011, Too Much Microcredit? A Survey of Issues and
Evidence on Over-Indebtedness among Micro-Borrowers. CGAP Occasional
Paper, Washington D.C., Retrieved from http://www.cgap.org/gm/document1.9.55377/OP19.pdf
Shiva, V. (2002). Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit. Cambridge,
MA: South End Press. Retrieved from http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy046/
2002100340.html
Singh, B., Ramasubban, R., Bhatia, R., Briscoe, J., Griffin, C., & Kim, C. (1993).
Rural Water-Supply in Kerala, India - How to Emerge From a Low-Level
Equilibrium Trap. Water Resources Research, 29(7), 1931-1942.
The World Bank Group. (2009). Innovative Finance for Development Solutions.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT/Resources/IF-for-DevelopmentSolutions.pdf

121

Tremolet, S., & Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2010).
Innovative Financing Mechanisms for the Water Sector. Paris: OECD.
UN WWAP. (2009). United Nations World Water Assessment Programme. The
World Water Development Report 3: Water in a Changing World. UNESCO:
Paris, France.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2011). Water and Governance.
Retrieved from
http://www.beta.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/environmentande
nergy/focus_areas/water_and_ocean_governance.html
VanDoren, V. J. (2003). Techniques for adaptive control. Butterworth-Heinemann.
Van Hofwegen, P. (2006). Task Force on Financing Water For All: Enhancing
Access to Finance for Local Governments. Financing Water for Agriculture.
Chaired by Angel Gurria. World Water Council.
Van Hofwegen, P. J. M., Jaspers, F. G. W., International Institute for
Infrastructural, Hydraulic and Environmental Engineering, & Inter-American
Development Bank. (1999). Analytical framework for integrated water

resources management: Guidelines for assessment of institutional frameworks.
Rotterdam; Brookfield, VT, USA: A.A. Balkema.
Winpenny, J. (2003 ). “Financing Water for All”. Report of World Panel on
Financing Water Infrastructure. Global Water Partnership/World Water
Council Third World Water Forum, 16—23 March, Kyoto.

122

Winpenny, J. (2010). Strategic Financial Planning for Water Supply and
Sanitation in Africa: Rationale, Methodology, Experience, Lessons Learned.
Stockholm, Sweden. EU Water Initiative, EUWI
Winz, I., Brierley, G., & Trowsdale, S. (2009). The use of system dynamics
simulation in water resources management. Water Resources Management,

23(7), 1301-1323. doi:10.1007/s11269-008-9328-7
Wolstenholme, E. F. (1982). System Dynamics in Perspective. Journal of the

Operational Research Society, 33(6), 547-556. doi:10.1057/jors.1982.117
Wolstenholme, E. F. (1983). System dynamics: A System Methodology or a System
Modelling Technique. Dynamica 9, 84-90.
World Bank. World Development Report. (1985). New York: Oxford University
Press. Incorporated July 1985. Retrieved from Catalog Record http://catalog.library.cornell.edu/cgibin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=6989213&DB=local

123

VITA
Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Sahar Zavareh
Degrees:
Bachelor of Business Administration, International Business, 2001
University of Houston – Downtown
Thesis Title: Development of a Sustainable Water Resource Financing
Mathematical Model for Donors and End-Users
Thesis Examination Committee:
Chairperson, Pushkin Kachroo, Ph.D.
Committee Member, Sajjad Ahmad, Ph.D.
Committee Member, Scott Nowicki, Ph.D.
Graduate Faculty Representative, Robert Futrell, Ph.D.

124

